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Introduction 
This report presents the basic figures and economic dimensions of public 
sector in Europe. It intends to be an introductory contribution to the 
PUBLIN project. The study of innovation in public sector can be introduced 
by a preliminary analysis about its structure, role and basic economics. This 
is particularly important in a Europe where different models, sizes, and 
organisational ways do exist. The significance and impacts of innovation in 
public administrations will be affected by differences in their sizes, 
dimensions, and socio-economic organisations. 
The public sector is based on old relationships between political authorities, 
organised through the State, and the citizens. This is not the right place to 
analyse the historical, philosophical and sociological justification of the 
State, limiting and/or guaranteeing, to some extent, and depending on the 
view, the freedom of people. However, it is necessary to point out that the 
public sector in Europe comes from a long tradition where the Absolute 
States in the 17th century and the French Revolution in the 18th Century 
constitute a key reference. The ideas of Hobbes or Rousseau established a 
philosophical justification of the State, given the limits of human nature 
when living in society. A relatively strong State is needed to manage 
societies and preserve individuals’ freedom. Public sectors were organised 
to perform a certain economic, political and cultural power. Sometimes they 
represent a power that should be limited to the guarantee of basic individual 
rights and basic social services (e.g. during the industrial revolution in the 
18th century). Some other views will involve something else –the State is 
considered to be responsible for certain major problems and it is legitimated 
to interfere actively in the society. Even more, some extreme views, like the 
ones derived from Hegel, support the concept of State as a good in itself, not 
only as a power  so the State act in full legitimacy to interfere in all 
dimensions of social and economic life.  
The modern public sector is a consequence of a long and even controversial 
process where different organisational models, sizes and profiles have been 
evolved. But, in any case, the State is actively present in social and 
economic life. Economic life constantly depends on the economic decisions 
of the governments, which can be illustrated in the taxes we pay. Personal 
income taxes, sales taxes, local taxes and contributions to Social Security 
mean a substantial proportion of personal income. Corporate income taxes, 
capital earnings taxes and other ones have an effect on capital owners. 
Almost everybody, receive at any time transferences from the government, 
such as the Social Security programmes. An important quote of the workers 
is paid by the State or produce goods betrayed by the public sector. Many 
children go to public schools, everybody enjoy public parks, highways and 
other services or infrastructures. More recently, many people are interested 
in the public politics from the environmental point of view, as the authority 
in charge of preserving natural resources and promoting sustainable 
development. 
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Contemporary politic theories are focused on showing politics as a mirror of 
the society, the political phenomenon as disaggregated consequence of 
individual behaviours, which are caused by subjective facts. However, some 
recent opinions within Political Science point out a link between this kind of 
phenomenon and the traditional economic study of institutions. This New 
Institutionalism focuses on the relative independence of political institutions 
and the importance of an intense comprehension of its functioning.  
Due to all these points, public sector really has a great economic and social 
importance all over market economies, but even much more within the 
European Union, where this research is focused on, so these economies are 
the best models of Welfare State economies. This fact becomes an economic 
achievement, and shows the EU trying to get the right balance between high 
social protection levels and income redistribution processes, what 
sometimes involve a certain trade-off between economic growth and income 
distribution. More recently, some other debates are in the centre of 
discussion about the modern role of States; for example, the debate about 
complementarity/substitutions between public and private (crowding out 
effects included); the debate about the conflict between Welfare State and 
competitiveness or the debate on modernisation and innovation of public 
sector (the key subject for PUBLIN).  Because of all these old and new 
debates, the present discussion about the size and structure of the public 
sector has a more direct effect on the European Union than on any other 
regions around the world. 
Both the importance of public sector within the modern economies and its 
structure and size, are very connected with the main core of the project in 
which this report is included: “Innovation in Public Sector –PUBLIN-”. As 
stated before, in order to understand the innovative processes underlying in 
the public services, it is necessary to have a solid basis about what the 
public sector is and what its relative importance and way of functioning are. 
So, it is necessary to make a previous analysis on the size and structure of 
the public sector within the European countries. 
The main objective of PUBLIN is to develop a general and consistent basis 
to understand both the main innovation processes in the public sector and 
policy-learning development within this sector. In order to achieve this 
objective, it is necessary to look at the public sector within the social 
context in which the institutions interact, and the relations between these 
and the private agents. In addition, it would be necessary to examine the 
influence of politics, management, evaluation, cultural treatment and 
entrepreneurship of the public sector on the development of innovative and 
learning processes. So, due to all this, it is necessary to set up a preliminary 
analysis about the structure and way of functioning of the European public 
sector. 
Following these ideas, this report is divided into three main chapters. After a 
brief introduction, some few theoretical hypotheses about the importance 
and way of functioning of the public sector in Europe will be introduced. In 
the second part, it will talk about the structure and organisation of public 
sector; and about its size in a third one, both at a theoretical and statistical 
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level. The research ends with few general conclusions summing up the main 
core facts discussed before. 
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First part: Public sector in Europe 
Public Sector: basic items 
The term ‘public sector’ is often used indiscriminately. Three definitions 
can be found (Khury and Van der Torre, 2002; Kuhry, 2003): 
Legal definition: the public sector includes government organisations and 
organisations governed by public law 
Financial definition: besides the above organisations, the public sector 
includes private organisations largely funded by public means, including 
non-profit organisations providing education and health care 
Functional definition: in this case the pubic sector includes all organisations 
in the field of the public administration, social security, law and order, 
education, health care, and social and cultural services, irrespective of their 
funding source and the legal form of the supplier. The functionally defined 
public sector is sometimes termed the ‘quaternary sector’ in policy debates 
in some European countries, such as Netherlands or Belgium. 
In this report, the functional definition is applied. Instead of the awkward 
term ‘quaternary sector’ the term ‘public service sector’ will be used in this 
context. 
The government perform a number of tasks which cannot simply be left to 
the market. They include the provision of ‘public goods’ and ‘private goods’ 
with major externalities (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1984). The consumption 
of public goods is non-rival and non-exclusive. Examples include dikes and 
national defence. Major externalities are associated with the consumption of 
private goods such as education (well-informed public, productivity of the 
labour force), health care (to counter epidemics) and cigarettes (premature 
death). Although is easier to recognize the public sector than it is to define it 
because its profile varies among countries and it is continuously changing, 
there are at least three important features of the public sector in democratic 
and advanced societies (Connolly and Munro, 1999), such as in the 
European countries: 
Compulsion: The Public Sector is the most powerful single institution in a 
society and has a monopoly over certain types of activity, law-making 
among them, maintaining an army and waging war with other countries. 
Accountability: Although it can be claimed that the public sector has a 
monopoly on power, in practice it is hemmed in by constraints, from the 
actions of the other states to the actions of its earlier self, in the form of the 
constitution (written or unwritten) and its laws, which do not constrain the 
government from writing new legislation, but do limit the other components 
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of the state, the judiciary, the Civil Service and other public sector 
organisations, such as schools. The constraint that makes democratic states 
different is that the members of their governments face the test of elections 
from time to time –they are accountable to all the voters of their countries. 
Motivation: A third and much disputed feature of the state concerns the 
motives of people working for the public sector and the expectation that 
other people have about such motives. State employees and, more generally, 
anyone within the public area, are expected to serve the “public interest” 
and, to a greater extent, compared to employees of profit-maximising 
organisations, tend to be motivated by desire to serve their country and its 
citizens.  
Of course, these features are present to some degree in many other kinds of 
organisation. Other institutions, such as firms and charities, also face 
democratic constraints on their activities, via shareholder or membership 
meetings, but the constraint of having to seek election is probably far more 
significant to a government than it is to the board of a company faced with 
the more immediate constraint of competition. Non-selfish motives can also 
be found throughout the economy (just as selfish motives are common 
within people who work for the state) and are of prime importance in 
families and many charities. The lesson is that it is probably dangerous to 
look for a unique property, which is possessed by all democratic states, but 
not by other institutions. In practice, it seems to be a cluster of attributes and 
their strength that makes the public sector unique. 
A further dimension to the question of what the public sector is is provided 
by the observation that, like most large organisations, the public sector is 
not a monolith; it operates at many levels. National or federal governments 
may control defence and foreign policy, while local or provincial 
governments deal with matters such as health and education, and waste 
collection and street lighting are dealt with at an even lower level. This 
separation of activities partly represents a managerial decision. In most 
European countries there also constitutional limits which separate out the 
powers of local and federal governments; and, an increasing proportion of 
power now lies beyond national governments in the organs of the European 
Union. 
The role of Public Sector in the current economies: 
The economic analysis usually lays on supposing that the markets adjust 
automatically, as if they operated in a universe without frictions, but this 
only is an abusive use of the classic metaphor of the “invisible hand”. Adam 
Smith in 1776 already explained clearly the weight of the institutional 
factors as conditioners of the performance of the individuals and, two 
centuries later, Ronald Coase defined as transaction costs the price that the 
economic agents have to pay to make the markets work. The creation of 
collective organisations like the State, that defines and guarantees an 
institutional frame in which the individuals and the companies act, lowers 
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the price of the transaction costs that these have to support, making possible 
the extension and functioning of markets. Consequently, the first task of the 
State in the economy is the configuration and maintenance of an 
institutional frame. This task is not superfluous or circumstantial, but it is 
the foundation of economic organisations. 
Nevertheless, the State is nowadays not limited to act like a legislator and 
referee for the deprived sector, but that in multiple aspects is an active 
participant in markets. Sometimes it conditions, with very concrete and not 
only generic regulations, prices, amounts and types of products to be 
interchanged; for example, through the fixation of the minimum wage, the 
electrical tariffs or the food quality regulations. In other cases, it acts more 
like an economic agent, going to the financial markets or undertaking 
enterprise activities in concurrence with the private sector; thus it happens 
when finances the deficit emitting public debt or manages state companies 
in sectors so varied as transport, health, mining or the financial system. It 
also modifies the distribution of the rent, by means of progressive direct 
taxes and systems of transference of rents, such as pensions; or it influences 
in the conditions of financing of the economy through the monetary policy. 
With such performances, the public sector is implied in the economic 
activity until the results obtained in the markets are corrected in order to 
improve them, taking care of objectives that, it assumes, are generalised 
social demands and they are not guaranteed without that intervention. 
The first of such objectives is to palliate market failures, such as the 
monopoly, externalities or public goods, in which the market by itself 
cannot obtain an efficient allocation of resources. The second objective is to 
modify the distribution of the rent in an equitable sense by means of a 
policy of public cost which it makes abundant transferences in cash 
(unemployment subsidy) or in species (education), financed with 
progressive tax systems. Third of the admitted general missions it is to 
reduce the cyclical disturbances of the economy and to obtain therefore a 
balanced footpath of growth, in which high levels of employment become 
compatible of stability of prices.  
In summary, the public sector in the economies of the advanced countries, 
and among them the European ones, fulfils one two-fold mission: he is 
creative and responsible of the institutional frame in which they operate the 
subjects and also an authority that take part actively in the economic 
processes correcting the results that would obtain the markets. Sometimes it 
has been denominated “arrangement policy” to the first one, and “process 
policy” to the second one. In order to take care of both tasks, the public 
sector has two generic instruments, by which it spills the principle of 
authority or capacity of coercion, the regulations and the public property, 
and a third instrument that does not need such principle, because the public 
sector, in theory, acts like a private agent itself, the state company. In this 
analysis, the second instrument will be explored, leaving the other two for 
later studies, since it is the instrument that specifies the size and structures 
of the public sector in the European countries.  
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Welfare State and typology of States: 
Theory and typology of States: 
One of the main roles that the public sector takes at the present time is to 
develop all the activities that the Welfare State implies, which means the 
displacement of certain areas of the social conflict to the sphere of public 
action. It is a public institutional space where, by means of a couple of 
social policies, interests are dissolved and collective necessities are solved. 
In strict sense, the field of the social policies extends, on the one hand, to 
the public interventions on the labour market and, on the other hand, to the 
redistribution conflict. In summary, the welfare policies are satisfied like 
collective management actions of the multiple axes of inequality, such as 
class ones, sort ones, of citizenship ones... - that furrow the multiple spheres 
that display the advanced societies at the beginning of the 21st century.  
In a strand of the literature, the performance of welfare states is linked to 
their institutions. A typology aims to explain the performance of national 
institutions for in the light of their key characteristics. One well-known 
typology of institutions for social protection found in welfare states was 
developed by Esping-Andersen (1990). Before that, between 1960-75 the 
three great models of European Keynesian Welfare State are based, which 
can be observed in table 1.1. Titmuss in 1974 had laid the way towards the 
consideration of three models differentiated of social protection in advanced 
Capitalism.  
Finally, in 1990, Esping-Andersen retakes this proposal and builds a very 
influential three-poled typology. In his approach, the defining characteristic 
of welfare states is the generosity and accessibility of government programs 
designed to protect the citizenry against loss of income and poverty. He 
proceeds by grouping countries on the basis of a historical sociological 
theory, and uses and analytical sociological model to define three types of 
welfare state that perform differently in their efforts to provide social 
protection. Each type is different in terms of the regulation of labour 
markets (primary protection) and the level and scope of income guarantees 
(secondary protection). He distinguishes, in particular, a Nordic or socialist 
model (with Sweden like paradigm), a Continental or Christian Democrat 
model (Germany) and an Anglo-Saxon or liberal model (United Kingdom). 
Eastern countries emerge as a separate type of welfare state (SCP/CERP, 
2004). This typology projects on three main dimensions of variation:  
- Three referring normative global ones that works as symbolic law 
foundation. For the liberal model, the WS represents the collective space of 
“attendance”, as opposed to the precise bankruptcy of the axis family-
market; for the Social Democrat model, the collective space of 
redistribution, before the unequal allocation of mercantile rents; for the 
Christian Democrat one, the collective space of security, opposing the risks 
of the disease, disability or elderly.  
  
 8
- Three ways to structure the social protection. The Nordic model 
articulates its supply of services and transferences on the foundation of the 
social rights of citizens, designs universal policies and supports them in a 
regime of direct and progressive taxation. The continental model articulates 
its social diary around the direct entailment of people to the labour market. 
The policies can offer intensive levels of protection per capita but its logic 
cover is selective, connected to the mechanism of labour quotes; the fiscal 
model leans then in good part on the regime of quotations. The liberal 
model articulates its supply of policies on the criterion of social need, 
offering services and selective transferences related to verifications of 
resources, that is to say, to the exigency to locate itself below a threshold of 
personal or familiar income and combining a regime of weak taxation with 
the financing of the public well-being together with the users of these 
services.  
- Three schemes of labour relations. The Nordic model is characterised by a 
high rate of cover of collective agreements, articulated to a very centralised 
and co-ordinated structure of social agreement, and to high indexes of union 
affiliation. All this is opposed to a model of little public regulative intensity 
of the labour market. The Continental regime displays the higher mean level 
of collective contractual cover, nevertheless it occurs in a more complex 
territorial and sectorial frame of negotiations and, mainly, in a context of 
smaller union-trade system. The State incidence on the labour market is 
very high. Unlike the previous model, this moves more towards public 
intervention. The Anglo-Saxon regime displays a different internal logic. 
The rates of union affiliation are located only behind the Nordics, but they 
mark the space of cover of collective negotiation very directly, which takes 
place in a much more complex scene, with predominance of the agreements 
of company over those sectorial or territorial. Furthermore, the regulative 
regime of the labour market is weak.  
In a systematic form, the literature on welfare states has been excluding the 
southern countries of Europe (Spain, Greece, Portugal, and partly Italy). 
Nevertheless, they nowadays receive equal importance that the rest of 
European countries, so some authors like Castles (1995) describe an 
alternative model for these countries defined by the low levels of social 
expenditure within the framework of political structures of well-being of 
clearly Continental type. It would be ahead of a Christian Democrat regime 
of social protection and labour, of still recent development. Other authors 
such as Rhodes (1997) maintain own aspects of the South. In agreement 
with this last approach, they can be summarised the characteristics of the 
Mediterranean-Latin Welfare State: 
- Centralised contributing social distribution and security system, very 
fragmented. 
- Assumption of universal models of health and education financed by 
taxes, with levels of expenditure per capita below the EU average and in 
coexistence with wider private sectors than in the rest of the EU. 
- Household attendance scheme 
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- Labour Relations with high rates of cover of collective negotiation but 
with very low union densities. 
- Excellent impact of the social and cohesion policies of the EU, 
quantitatively as well as qualitatively. 
Mediterranean countries are characterised by limited access to social 
security, but a high level of pension benefits. Corporatist countries score 
fairly low on both points, liberal countries score low on providing pensions 
and social-democratic countries score high on access to social security 
programs. In fact, Eastern European countries resemble corporatist countries 
to a great extent. While responsibility for social protection rests largely with 
the individual in liberal countries and with the public sector in social-
democratic countries, in corporatist countries (Nordic and Eastern ones) it is 
more the province of civil society, with an important role for employer, 
professional and trade associations. If European countries are analysed at 
this moment, it will be observed that four-fold (or five-fold) welfare state 
typology, with all their characteristics.  
Other studies have attempted to find a relationship between key 
demographic indicators and the institutions of welfare states. For example, 
Mellens (1999) has tried to relate birth rate, migration, family formation and 
the death rate to dominant socio-economic and cultural treats of welfare 
states. Socio-economic characteristics here include level of income, 
educational attainment and health status of the population. Cultural 
characteristics include gender equality, conservatism, individualism and 
post-modernism. In fact, his classification is largely consistent with the 
classification based on the degree of social protection. Mediterranean, 
Scandinavian, Central European and Eastern European types can be 
distinguished, although he finds no liberal cluster in his analysis. 
Features on social protection in Europe: 
The modern-day welfare state remains on action plans like the ones included 
in the Beveridge Report (Beveridge, 1942), which established a social 
insurance system protecting households from the insurable risks of poverty. 
The scheme was intended to provide support to those groups most in need of 
social welfare, namely, the elderly, sick, unemployed and families on low 
incomes. 
Expenditure on social protection has risen since the inception of the Welfare 
State until this moment; and as can be seen in figure 1.1, expenditure on 
social protection has accounted for a growing proportion of central 
government expenditure and gross domestic product during the first years of 
the 90s, until 1993 (from an average of 25.5% of GDP to just over 28.5%). 
In the last 90’s years this trend went down, coinciding with the end of the 
recession of the early 1990s, which pushed up expenditure on 
unemployment benefits in particular, but also on disability and housing 
benefits. Only in Portugal, Greece, Germany, Austria, Belgium and 
Luxembourg, spending continued to rise relatively to GDP over the three 
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years going from 1993 to 1996. In the first two, it reflected the ongoing 
development of the social following-protection system, and in the last year, 
the failure of their economies fully recovered as in most of the Union. 
Therefore, it can be observed how the evolution shows in 1999 similar 
social protection levels than in 1990 in almost all the countries analysed. 
During the first years of the 21st century the social protection expenditures 
has softly risen or stayed around the same numbers than in the last 90s 
years. 
Figure 1.1 Social protection expenditure for selected European countries (as % of GDP) 
 
Source: Eurostat (2004).
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By the year 2002, the total welfare expenditure of the European Union had 
reached 6748 euros per habitant. In relation to output, overall spending on 
social protection in the Union, gross of any taxes or charges levied on 
benefits, amounted to 28% of GDP. The level of spending ranged from 
more than 30% of GDP in France, Germany, Denmark and Sweden, (with 
Sweden having the highest level at around 32.5% of GDP), to less than 25% 
of GDP in Iceland, Spain and Luxembourg, and only 16% of GDP in 
Ireland. In very broad terms, the countries with the highest level of GDP per 
head tend to spend proportionately more on social expenditure, but the 
relationship is by no means systematic, with expenditure in Sweden and 
Finland, in particular, being higher than it would be expected on this basis, 
and expenditure in Italy and Ireland being lower. 
It is also observed a common pattern of social expenditure among the 
European countries. Spending on old-age accounts for by far the largest 
element of social protection in the European Union, amounting to an 
average of 40.7% of the total spending in 2002, with sickness and healthcare 
the second largest, accounting for just over 27.8% of the total. Outlays on 
disability and family and children benefits were of a similar size, each 
accounting for just over 8.1% of total outlays. Expenditure on 
unemployment is only slightly smaller, on average, than outlays on 
disability and family and children, while spending on the other three kinds 
of benefits –survivors, housing and social exclusion- taken together is much 
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the same size as this, averaging around 8.5% of overall spending. The main 
areas of expenditure are shown in figure 1.2. 
Figure 1.2 Government welfare spending 2002 in the EU  
(as %  over total social expenditure in the EU) 
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It is important to point out the changing context of social protection systems 
which has had profound implications and will continue to do so in future 
years for social protection systems analysed before. The following four 
major trends are of particular importance: the age of the population in all 
Member States and the prospective increase in the rate of growth in the 
number of elderly people from 2010 onwards; the growing participation of 
women in the labour force and the changing gender balance; the persistence 
of long-term unemployment, especially among older workers, and the trend 
towards earlier retirement; and the increase in the number of households in 
relation to the population growth, with the rise of people living on their own 
and households with no working member. 
Moreover, these trends are occurring in a context of increasing globalisation 
and a faster pace of technical advance, which have accelerated the speed of 
structural change in the economy, put greater pressure on business and 
workers alike to adapt to changing market circumstances and new working 
methods, and reduced the ability of governments to manage economic 
developments. At the same time, they have increased the importance of 
securing financial stability and have limited the scale of government 
borrowing, as well as constrained the growth of public expenditure. Public 
policies are directly affected by fiscal consolidation required by the Stability 
and Growth Pact, as well as by the broad economic policy guidelines, which 
provide a framework for reforming public policies in line with broader 
objectives, supporting employment and job creation in particular. 
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Second part: Structure of the public sector in Europe 
After the rapid expansion of the welfare state in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
public sector has been under considerable pressure in the past few decades. 
Declining public confidence in government institutions and growing 
demands on public finances have prompted governments to initiate 
measures to trim the public sector and make it more efficient and effective.
 Thus, after the great crisis in the 1980s, a “new” state is being built 
during the 1990s in the European Union. This “new” state will be the 
outcome of deep reforms –reforms that will enable the state to perform the 
roles that market is not able to perform. The objective is to build a state that 
responds to the needs of its citizens, a democratic state where bureaucrats 
respond to politicians and politicians to voters in an accountable way. For 
that reason, there are essential moves: political reform to increase the 
legitimacy of governments; fiscal adjustment, privatisation, deregulation to 
reduce the size of the state and improve its financial health; and 
administrative reform that, in addition to improving the financial situation of 
the state, will provide the means of good governance. Reform of the state 
apparatus, a reform the will allow for a managerial public administration in 
the public sector, is discussed (Bresser Pereira, 1997). 
Reform strategies adopted can be catalogued as: maintain, modernise, 
marketise and minimise (Pollit and Bouckaert 2004): 
‘Maintain’ involves tightening up traditional control mechanisms. The 
existing system is stretched, for example, by placing linear restrictions on 
expenditure (the ‘cheese slice method’), with no downward revision of 
policy targets. Another example of the Maintain strategy is more detailed 
control of expenditure programs. Although this strategy causes less 
disruption in the functioning of government organisations, it is probably not 
adequate to tackle existing financial and legitimacy problems of the public 
sector. 
‘Modernise’ involves organising alternative structures and processes of 
government policy making. However, any modernisation operation must be 
consistent with traditional values of public service provision. The public 
sector is intrinsically different from the private sector, and any fundamental 
reform has to take account of these differences. The focus of reforms is to 
improve management (managerial modernisation) and/or to foster 
participation by citizens and user groups (participatory modernisation). 
‘Marketise’, the third strategy, involves introducing a private-sector focus to 
the public sector and its values. It does not mean that services are privatised. 
The aim is still primarily to reform the public sector, not to reduce its scope 
and public outlays. Techniques common to the private sector are 
transplanted wholesale to the public sector. In doing so, the unique character 
of public sector services is implicitly called into question. One example of 
this strategy has been the introduction of internal competition (competitive 
tendering) in the United Kingdom. 
 13
‘Minimise’ – reducing the public sector – involves privatising functions that 
have traditionally been in the domain of the public sector. The railways in 
the United Kingdom are quoted as the poorest example of privatisation, but 
privatisation has been much more successful in other sectors (such as 
telecommunications) and in most cases the new enterprises and the new 
markets become much more efficient and performing.  
Public Sector Organization in Europe 
Generally, the public sector in Europe takes part in the economy using three 
basic instruments: regulations, public property and state companies. While 
the last ones are organizing instruments of private initiative, adopted 
sometimes by governments, regulations and public property are eminently 
public action instruments, which are put into practice by means of exclusive 
organisations: Public Administrations. Therefore, from a structural point of 
view, the European public sector is composed at a national level by the 
Public Administrations and the state companies (see figure 2.1). 
Although there are some differences between countries, in general, Public 
Administrations act basing on the criterion of authority and not on the 
market, and the main part of its financing, reflected in budgets, is obtained 
coercively through the tax system. Within them, it is necessary to 
distinguish among Central Administration, Social Security Administration 
and Regional Administrations. The Central Administration is composed by 
the State and the Independent Institutions and controls most of the public 
revenues, although the decentralisation process in favour of the Regional 
Administrations and the growth of pensions has made it to lose importance 
throughout the recent years. The centralisation of income, on the other hand, 
causes that the State is the origin of multiple transferences towards the 
remaining Administrations, with which these finance their activity to a large 
extent. 
Figure 2.1: Organization in European Public Sector 
 
Source: Based on Serrano, J.M. (1997). 
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The functions of Social Security Administration are not territorial, but rather 
specialises in the management of the original core of the Welfare State, i.e. 
the social protection costs, mainly including pensions and health services. 
Its financial system varies according to the countries, although, in general, it 
is usually mixed: it receives direct contributions from the social quotations 
paid by the workers and managers, and receives transferences from the State 
in an increasing proportion of its total income. 
One of the great recent organisational changes in the European public sector 
is the intense and fast decentralisation process of Regional Administrations. 
It is important to point out that this process has not become at the cost of 
Local Corporations, whose importance has stabilised, but by reduction of 
the weight of the State.  
The other main part of the public sector in Europe, along with the 
Administrations, is state companies, usually divided into commercial and 
industrial, on the one hand, and financial, on the other one. State companies 
were created in order to reach, by their participation in the markets, certain 
considered strategic objectives for the State, such as the presence or the 
control of key productive sectors (such as energy, transport, 
communications or defence), or the promotion of the national or slow zones 
development. In the last decades, it has been registered a privatisation 
process of the state companies throughout the European Union, where the 
number of the state companies has been remarkably reduced. 
Finally, due to the process of integration carried out in Europe in the 50s 
and 60s it is also necessary to speak of the institutions of the European 
Union within the structure of public sector in Europe, as much in the scope 
of the regulations as in the public property. On one hand, many laws and 
rules addressed to national economic agents are announced by the European 
Union institutions; on the other hand, although the EU financial activity is 
residual in some countries, e.g. Mediterranean countries, this is constantly 
increasing in the recent years.  
Reforming state structure in Europe: Re-organisation and 
decentralisation 
Nowadays, although structural adjustment remains a major objective in 
European countries, the emphasis has changed to the reform of the state, and 
particularly to the administrative reform. Now, the central issue is how to 
rebuild the state and how to redefine a new state in a global world. This 
change of focus is also taking place in the European Union, where the 
administrative reform has been added to the tax reform, as well as the social 
security reform and the elimination of state monopolies. Comprehensive 
reforms of public administration in many countries during the 1970s and 
1980s have given way to more targeted reforms. Recent reforms in the 
public sector have often been carried out as a response to pressures to limit 
public spending, to strengthen economic performance or to keep up with the 
innovations introduced in the private sector, such as the introduction of 
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information technologies. Country-specific forces are usually at the root of 
public sector reforms (Knox, 2002). 
Table 2.1: Recent reforms in the Public Sector 
Type of reform Human resources management Introduction of ICT 
Privatisation and 
outsourcing 
Mechanisms 
Improvements in the incentive 
structure (wage differentiation, 
hiring and firing practices, 
promotion) 
Introduction of ICT, changes in 
working methods and e-
Government practices 
 
Arms-length agencies, 
privatisation of service 
providers, and public-private 
partnerships 
Critical factors Reliable output and performance indicators 
Quality of information, time 
savings, speed of response in 
interaction with citizens and 
businesses, and common 
standards across public agencies 
 
increasingly efficiency, 
productivity, profitability and 
capital investment spending, risk 
sharing, management skills, and 
employment reductions 
Examples New Public Management and Total Quality Management 
e-Europe 2005 Action Plan and 
US Government 2002 
Programme 
 
See Bennet et al. (2004), 
Claessens and Djankov (2002), 
Frydman et al. (1999), Gonenc et 
al. (2000), Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta (2003), Van der Nord 
(2002), and La Porta and Lopez-
de-Silanes (1999). 
 
Source: European Commission (2005) 
  
Table 2.1. summarises the three types of reforms to enhance efficiency in 
the public sector: management reforms, introduction of information 
technology; and privatisation and outsourcing processes. 
It will now summarise some reasons for the increasing interest in state 
reform in the 1990s. An important one is probably that people realised that 
structural adjustment was not enough, if it is not linked to an administrative 
one. Since the mid-1980s, the countries engaged in fiscal adjustment, trade 
liberalisation, privatisation, and deregulation. Outcomes were positive. On 
the other hand, it became increasingly clear that the basic cause of the great 
crisis in the 1980s was a state crisis: a fiscal crisis of the state, a crisis in the 
model of state intervention, and a crisis of bureaucratic form by which the 
state is managed. The solution is not to weaken with the state, but to rebuild 
it, to reform it. The reform will probably mean shrinking the state to limit its 
role as a producer of goods and services, and to a lesser extent, as a 
regulator; but it will possibly entail the social services, where externalities 
or basic human rights are involved, and it would also increase its role in 
promoting international competitiveness for local industries. 
In the recent years, people are becoming increasingly aware that 
bureaucratic public administration is inconsistent with the demands that 
civil society has in contemporary capitalism in relation to governments. 
People demand much more from the state than it can deliver. And the 
immediate reason for that gap is not only fiscal, as O’Connor (1992) pointed 
out, nor just political, as Huntington (1968) stressed. It is also 
administrative. Economic and political resources are by definition scarce, 
but this limitation may be partially overcome by efficient use by the state. 
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The role of a proficient public administration becomes strategic in reducing 
the gap between social demands and their fulfilment. 
There is however, a broader reason for the interest in reforming the state and 
particularly public administration: the increasing relevance of protecting the 
public patrimony (res publica) against rent-seeking activities. The state is 
meant to be public, public non-profit organizations (or non-governmental 
organisations) are meant to be public. Strictly public goods, as a protected 
environment, are meant to be public. Public rights are the rights people 
have, those that the public patrimony, the res publica, understood in a broad 
sense to be public –of and for everybody- instead of the object of rent 
seeking, instead of being fully “privatised” to private enterprises. Public 
sectors can be provided by public funding under private management or the 
civil sector. Reform of public sector means less direct provision by the State 
and more public services provided by the society.  
This new Managerial Public Administration has some basic characteristics: 
i) It is outcome- and citizen-oriented, ii) It assumes that politicians and civil 
servants are entitled to a limited degree of trust, iii) It uses decentralisation 
and the incentive to creativity and innovation as strategy, and iv) It controls 
public managers by means of management contracts. This characteristic 
structure of public sector emerged with strength in Britain in the 1980s, but 
yet similar reforms have taken place in some other European countries, such 
as Sweden, Norway or France, and in other countries, such as United States, 
Australia or New Zealand. This kind of state structure is usually identified 
with neoliberal views because managerial techniques were often introduced 
simultaneously with structural adjustment programs aiming to cope with the 
fiscal crisis of the state. Neoliberalism arose as a reaction against the 
budgetary crisis and so became identified with spending cuts, downsizing 
the state. Despite of this, different ideologies move forward this same way, 
although with different methods and intensities. This fact, plus the obvious 
superiority of managerial over bureaucratic administration, led governments 
of all ideological tendencies to get involved in administrative reforms, that 
usually have a two-fold orientation: expenditure reduction in the short run, 
increased efficiency through managerial orientation, innovation to a certain 
extent,  in the medium run. 
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Managerial public administration, as it has been seen, involves a change of 
management strategy, but this strategy must be put to work in a reformed 
administrative structure. The general idea is the decentralisation of 
delegation authority (as it can be seen in figure 2.2). Many authors contend 
that authority or control, especially in government, must be decentralised in 
order to provide more responsive support to end users, eliminate 
bureaucratic obstacles to program accomplishment, improve inter-
departmental, co-ordination and empower service delivery managers to 
procure what they need without impediment by a centralised organisation 
(Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). It is interesting to point out that this 
decentralisation process in the internal structure of European countries is 
developing inside a collusion phenomenon between the different countries 
making up the European Union. 
Public control officials have been pulled in a number of different directions 
attempting to articulate the ideal level where policy making, authority and 
process should be positioned in the hierarchy. As figure suggests, three 
primary organisational models have emerged (McCue and Pitzer, 2000). 
Traditionally prescribed is a fully centralised control system where the lines 
of authority and functional responsibility are clearly articulated. A mid-
range model is a centralised/decentralised form where authority emanates 
from a given unit that is charged with policy making and oversight 
responsibility for the control process, as well as facilitating the line 
departments’ use of the control authority granted to those units. The last 
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organisational form, a purely decentralised structure, has no central 
authority or control agency other than the enabling legislation or control 
policies enacted by the legislative body, and service and sub-service 
delivery managers are both responsible for and accountable for the success 
or failure of their politics. 
Decentralization in this way has many faces. One is functional 
decentralization, whereby resources and powers are developed to semi-
autonomous institutions. Then there is territorial decentralization, which 
increases the role of other tiers of government, such as regions and local 
authorities. Decentralization is usually approached from a financial 
perspective, with a focus on devolving public resources. Figure 2.3 shows 
the proportion of the government budget spent by local authorities. Three 
groups of countries may be distinguished. Firstly, the Scandinavian 
countries, with a very strong local sector (accounting one third of total 
spending). The second group comprises a number of Central European 
(accounting for 20%-30%). One notably country included in this cluster is 
France, which generally has a centralist image. Finally, we have a number 
of countries with a small local sector, mainly Southern European countries, 
and also Ireland and Belgium. 
Figure 2.3: Spending by local authorities, 2000 (% of total government expenditure) 
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These figures give a first impression because they must always be viewed in 
the light of autonomy which local authorities have. Indicators of autonomy 
include spending freedom and freedom to collect resources. The latter 
concerns the freedom to increase or cut back certain flows of income, and 
the former an authority’s freedom to spend its income as it sees fit. If these 
indicators are analysed, the groups identified above remain largely intact 
(SCP, 2004). Another indicator of the degree of decentralization is the 
distribution of public servants among the different tiers of government. Data 
show a shift in staff employed by central government to staff on the payroll 
of local and regional authorities. The proportion of public servants working 
in central government is declining, while the proportion of staff working at 
the local and regional level is on the increase (Pollitt and Brouckaert, 2004). 
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Administrative cultures and systems. 
Differences in administrative culture have a major impact both on 
fundamental choices concerning the structure of the public sector, and on 
the daily functioning of the government apparatus. Administrative culture 
forms part of a wider political and social culture. Hofstede’s dimensions are 
probably the best-known categorisation of administrative cultures 
(Hofstede, 1980), although other attempts have been made (Mamadouh, 
1999). It is clearly no simple matter to group countries on the basis of their 
administrative culture. Loughlin (1994) groups countries on the basis of 
broad philosophical and cultural traditions. He distinguishes an Anglo-
Saxon (minimal state), a Germanic-organicist and a French Napoleonic state 
tradition. The Scandinavian type is a mix of the first two. Finally, Hooghe 
(2002) used four dimensions developed by Page (1995) –cohesion, 
autonomy from political control, caste-like character and non-permeability 
of external interest- to construct and index of ‘Weberian bureaucratic 
tradition’ (strong, medium, weak), indicating to what degree a national 
administrative culture corresponds to the Weberian model (strong cohesion, 
large degree of autonomy from political control, strong caste-like character 
of the bureaucracy and low permeability of external interests). Her research 
focused on the European Commission, where differences in administrative 
cultures are of course more pronounced. 
The categorisations discussed traditionally have their own focus, so it is 
difficult to obtain a clear picture. The categorisation of some countries 
seems fairly coherent, but the absence of clear indicators means it still 
entails some risk. The Anglo-Saxon tradition differs considerably from the 
continental tradition. This is reflected, among other things, in the fact that 
many public servants in the UK are generalists, while in Germany they tend 
to have a legal background. The large number of studies of cultural 
differences among European public servants shows how important it is to 
take a more in-depth look at this subject. Obviously, the evolution towards a 
European Administrative Space will be affected by different views on the 
role of the public administration in society. 
Administrative processes. 
This section reviews administrative processes associated with the machinery 
that allows government to pursue its policies. Policy implementation is 
supported by administrative processes such as financial management, 
human resources management and information technology (fundamentally, 
e-Government). The scope of this section extends to the public sector in 
general, but the government –and the public administration in particular- is 
responsible for the quality of financial management, human resources and 
openness in the public sector. 
Managing the public sector finances, various factors have prompted public 
authorities to modernise their budget cycle. The financial reform agenda 
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consists on three major components: greater financial responsibility, results-
based budget and multi-year budget.  
The New Public Management movement has shifted the focus from 
traditional a priori control to control in retrospect, and placed more 
emphasis on results and greater financial responsibility for management. 
Two indicators of the degree of parliamentary control over the budget and 
of management freedom are the degree of detail to which the budget is 
appropriated and the end of year flexibility. The more aggregated the 
appropriation, the more freedom management has to change the budget 
allocation. And the end of year flexibility allows managers to carry any 
surplus budget allocation over to next year’s budget. Thus, the countries 
with the highest degree of management freedom in Europe are Denmark, 
United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, while Belgium or Spain are 
examples of those with the least discretionary powers (European 
Commission, 2005). 
The growing important of efficiency and effectiveness has prompted 
governments to focus more and more on results as the basis for their 
budgets. Information on output and outcome is included in those and a 
number of countries are in fact moving towards accrual budgeting, a system 
of costs and benefits, instead of traditional cash-based budget systems. 
Finland or Sweden are countries which have full or partial accrual budgeting 
in Europe, while Ireland, Portugal, Austria or Greece maintain the 
traditional line-item cash budget geared mainly to inputs, with little 
performance information. The Netherlands, Denmark or Spain include 
performance information in the budget documents, but have opted not to 
make the move to accrual budgeting (European Commission, 2005). 
The third trend in the modernisation of government finances has been a 
move towards multi-year budgets. Most countries add multi-year forecasts 
to their budgets to place their annual income and expenditure in a longer-
term perspective. In most cases, these forecasts are purely informative and 
do not require parliamentary approval. However, in some countries, such as 
Italy, parliament does have to do it. 
Personnel policy, or human resources management is another horizontal 
policy area within the public sector currently experiencing change. Strategic 
human resources policy, competency management, equal opportunities 
policy and public service motivation are key concepts in the modernisation 
of human resources management. One important choice in public sector 
human resources management policy is whether to attempt to ensure that the 
staff profile reflects the composition of the population. Moreover, the 
Lisbon agenda aims to raise the employment rate of women during the next 
years. The problem of demographic ageing also presents the public sector 
with a major challenge. The preponderance of staff aged over 50 in the 
public service has increased steadily since 1990. As the baby boom 
generation retires over the next ten years, the public service may face a 
growing staff shortage. Personnel planning and the recruitment of young 
staff by prompting the public sector as a good employer are therefore key 
objectives of current human resources policy. 
 21
Finally, the development of a knowledge-based society also has 
implications for the services and communications of the public sector. There 
is a general tendency in the public sector towards automating bureaucratic 
procedures and processes, and electronic interaction with citizens. However, 
e-government is a very broad concept, ranging from electronic 
communications, via online services to e-democracy and e-participation. e-
Government is one of the newest forms of modernisation in the public 
sector. In this field, benchmarks are frequently used to compare and rank 
countries (Jansen et al., 2004). Among European countries, Scandinavian 
ones (Sweden, Finland and Denmark) and United Kingdom are the countries 
with the best average score on almost all these studies. On the other side, 
countries such as Ireland and Southern European countries (Italy, Spain, 
Portugal and Greece) score below average in terms of e-government. The 
newly acceded EU member states score less well than the EU-15, although 
Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia have progressed furthest in the 
field of e-government during the last years. 
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Third part: Size of the public sector in Europe 
Government growth theories 
In the post-war period, the European public sectors have exhibited a 
remarkable growth, slowing down only recently, especially as a 
consequence of the European Monetary Union (EMU) requirements. In the 
spirit of Wagner’s Law (Wagner, 1958), public expenditure is expected to 
be the outcome of income growth. Furthermore, with the public sector 
growing more than proportionally relative to the private sector, the long-run 
income elasticity of government expenditure is expected to exceed unity. On 
the other hand, within the Keynesian context, public expenditure is the 
exogenous policy instrument leading to economic growth. To test the 
Wagnerian versus the Keynesian hypothesis, the vast majority of empirical 
studies focus on a two-variable model involving (aggregate or 
disaggregated) government expenditure and domestic income. However, it 
can be observed that general government expenditure and its growth can be 
patterned not only in terms of demand-side but also in terms of supply-side 
and institutional factors. 
Distinguishing between demand-side and supply-side theories of 
government size allows for the distinction between responsive government, 
whose public expenditure is justified by the electors’ preferences, and 
excessive government, which spends beyond the limits imposed by the 
demand-side following bureaucrats’ or politicians’ interests (Buchanan, 
1977) 
Demand-side theories of government growth: 
One of the most popular models of government growth is represented by 
Wagner’ Law, which focuses on the demand for goods and services 
provided by the public sector. It looks at the growth of government both in 
terms of economic growth and the increasing complexity of the economy 
that increase frictions and externalities, requiring further government 
activities and regulatory intervention. Economic growth has the additional 
effect of enhancing the demand for welfare services, whose components 
typically exhibit a superior income-elasticity. Wagner also attributes public 
sector growth to the central and especially to the local government, a 
distinction that has rarely been recognised in modern versions of Wagner’s 
Law (Gemmell, 1993). These theories are empirically verified when the 
long-run income elasticity of government expenditure is higher than unity. 
Other demand-side theories expand Wagner’s Law by adding further 
explanatory variables to government growth, aimed at capturing the 
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complexity of the economy. The most popular variables used in this case are 
the urbanisation and industrialisation of the economy (Henrekson, 1988). 
Another factor expected to increase the public sector size is the openness of 
the economy. It enhances the role of the public sector as social insurer 
against external risk (Rodrik, 1998). A different perspective is obtained by 
considering the redistributive function of the state, which adds the impact of 
the relative income on the government growth. This is based on the 
consideration that economic growth can lead to rising unequality and 
therefore to votes for redistribution (Meltzer and Richar, 1981). The last 
demand-side theory showed in this part is Peacock-Wiseman’s. According 
to their interpretation, the government share remains fairly stable over time. 
However, it increases stepwise as a consequence of major social 
disturbances such as wars that loosen the constraint imposed by the electors’ 
willingness to pay taxes. 
Supply-side theories of government growth: 
Relaxing the neutrality assumption and allowing for bureaucrats and 
politicians to have preferences on the size and composition of public 
expenditure leads to supply-side aspects of government growth models. 
Bureaucracy has the effect of increasing the size of government. The idea 
here is that public officers attempt to maximise the budget of the office they 
run because they can derive some private advantages in terms of higher 
‘salaries, perquisites of office, public reputation, power and patronage’ 
(Niskasen, 1971), exploiting their informational advantage over citizens-
electors. 
The role of bureaucratic power is particularly emphasised by Brennan and 
Buchanan’s (1980) Leviathan theory, where the government’s main 
objective is to maximise its revenues, therefore transforming the benevolent 
public goods provider state into a malevolent revenue maximise entity, 
following Hobbes’s Leviathan. 
At last, fiscal illusion can also be considered as a supply-side factor of 
government growth. This can be captured by a proxy for the complexity of 
the fiscal system. The idea is that the agent-legislator exploits the fact that 
principal taxpayers cannot correctly ascertain their tax burden, therefore 
loosening the constraint on government expenditure imposed by the 
electors’ willingness to pay taxes (Puviani, 1903) 
Institutional factors: 
The analysis of government growth in terms of demand and supply risks 
would be incomplete without the consideration of the institutional 
framework where decisions on government expenditure are taken. This is 
particularly important in the case of the European Union, within which 
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essential reforms in terms of integration and fiscal federalism had been 
carried out over the years. 
In particular, it is important to consider the constraints on government 
growth imposed at a supranational level by the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and 
the European Growth and Stability Pact (1997), which have a constitutional 
valence and therefore can be effective in limiting government growth. 
Indeed the Leviathan can be limited by imposing balanced budget 
constitutional rules and restrictions on the government’s capacity to print 
money, with the ultimate restriction of denying government the power to 
create money under any circumstances at all. To a certain extent, this theory 
appears to have influenced the design of the EMU. The European Central 
Bank is statutorily independent from other European Union or national 
bodies, and the Maastricht criteria, followed by the Growth and Stability 
Pact, have the effect of imposing budgetary discipline at a constitutional 
level. 
Another important institutional variable is given by the different levels of 
fiscal federalism observed in a country over time, as a consequence of the 
different equilibria reached over time between the two opposite tendencies 
of centralisation and devolution of state competencies to local governments. 
Related to government size theories, it would be interesting to indicate other 
three theories which link the size of public sector and the modern economic 
environment, characterised by globalisation and decentralisation processes 
(Shadbegian, 1999). Although this study tests those theories from the United 
States, it can be also applied to the European Union due to their similar 
characteristics: 
Wallis decentralisation hypothesis: He theorises that as fiscal 
decentralisation increases, state and local public expenditures increase and 
federal government expenditures decrease. Fiscal decentralisation is defined 
as the relation between lower (regional and local) government spending and 
total government spending. 
Brennan-Buchanan decentralisation hypothesis: They indicate that as 
fiscal decentralisation increases, total government spending decreases. 
Brennan-Buchanan collusion hypothesis: It is shown that collusion 
among the different levels of government leads to an increase in overall 
government spending and to an increase in spending at each individual level 
of government, because it weakens the disciplining power of fiscal 
federalism. Collusion is defined as the relation between the upper 
government’s grants in aid to lower government and total lower government 
receipts. 
These hypotheses have been shown in European countries over the last 
years, when a decentralisation process has started in each individual 
country, together with an increasing phenomenon of fiscal collusion or 
integration between different countries under the EMU discipline. 
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Measuring the size of public sector 
With the purpose of providing a quantitative impression of the size of the 
State, it was needed to treat a certain number of definition questions. Firstly, 
what does it mean by ‘public sector’? For some categories of expenditure, 
such as the national defence, there is no doubt with respect to what is 
included. Nevertheless, many of the activities of the government looked 
much as private. Everything depends on whether anyone is interested in the 
aspect of the product passed or not passed by the market, or in the wideness 
of the governmental control (or other criteria). Once this wideness has been 
determined, it is precise to solve the question of the appropriate indicator to 
measure the magnitude of the activity of the government.  
Secondly, in the case of goods and services supplied by the public sector (as 
they are, for example, national defence or public education) it has to 
consider the fact that the value of public expenditure in goods and services 
is measured, conventionally, by the value of the factors, instead of by the 
value of products. In other words, which it is measured is the cost of market 
of the resources used by the public sector. Nevertheless, this is not 
completely satisfactory. Whereas for most of the private goods can be 
discriminated the relative evaluation of individuals with respect to different 
goods, by means of the prices of market, the process to obtain a comparable 
measurement of the value of certain governmental services does not turn out 
so directly.  
Thirdly, the transference payments are excluded from the national rent, 
since they only imply redistribution. And in case anyone is interested in the 
direct use of real resources in the public sector, then, the transferences 
would also have to be excluded from the public expenditure. On the other 
hand, it could be said that this undervalues the importance of the public 
activity and, therefore, that it would have to use gross measurements that 
include the transferences. Similar problems arise with the subsidies and the 
preferential tax treatments in general.  
The existence of these well-known difficulties shows that there are several 
and different ways through which it can measure the dimension or the size 
of the public sector (for example, including or excluding the divisions of 
capital; including or excluding the payments from transference), and that 
there is a certain degree of abuse in any definition. This is the main reason 
why the numbers related to the magnitude of public expenditure, expressed 
as percentage of the GDP, and that are handled in the debates about the 
public sector, can differ so widely. Even more, this can be applied to 
another series of measures that are based on the public income by taxes, for 
example.  
Consequently, any quantitative evaluation of the magnitude of the public 
sector must be observed with much precaution, and the empirical evidence 
showed in figures 3.1 and 3.2 has to take refuge without forgetting that 
qualification. These numbers show, respectively, the percentage of public 
figures in some European countries for the year 2003, as well as the 
participation of the tax income in the GDP for those countries and a 
classification that takes care of the types of more outstanding taxes. 
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Figure 3.1: Public figures in the European countries in 2002 (as % of GDP) 
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 Source: Based on OCDE (2004) 
Given the difficulties described above, it is only possible to reach very 
general conclusions, but it is obvious that can be extracted the magnitude of 
the public budget in figure 3.1 so that it is measured in terms of the total 
public expenditure or in terms of the total public revenue. They can be 
observed countries above 50% of GDP in public figures, such as the Nordic 
ones (Finland, Denmark and Sweden), France, Belgium and Austria. On the 
other side, countries such as Mediterranean countries (Spain, Portugal and 
Greece), have only around 40%-45%, and Ireland around 35%, near the 
levels of other countries such as Japan or the United States. 
In terms of net public saving, almost all analysed countries, except Greece, 
Portugal and Japan, have positive public saving in 2000, but in 2003 other 
countries such as the United States, France, Germany, Netherlands, Italy or 
United Kingdom presents higher public expenditures than revenues. 
Besides, differences among countries exist. Whereas Norway surpass the 
11% of its GDP, countries such as Ireland, Luxembourg, Finland and Spain, 
are located from 2.6% (Spain) to 6.2% (Luxembourg), and the remaining 
countries have levels of public saving less than or equal to 2% of their GDP. 
The European Union has relatively high levels on average, with a 0.9% of 
its GDP of public saving, more than three points higher than the one in the 
United States. 
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Figure 3.2: Taxation revenues in different countries 2002 (as % of GDP) 
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The participation of taxes in the selected countries in graph 3.2 show a wide 
range of variation: from over 50% of GDP (in Sweden and Denmark) to 
almost 35% (in Ireland and the Mediterranean European countries). By 
types of taxation on EU average (figure 3.3), taxes over goods and services 
accounts for by far the largest element, amounting to an average of 30.1% of 
the total taxes revenues of the Union in the year 2002, and with personal 
income taxes the second largest accounting for 25.8% of the total. Social 
Security contributions (so by employers as by employees) account for 
25.3% of the total of public taxation revenue. Far from these, other taxes 
and corporate income taxes are located, which account for 10.0% and 8.9% 
of the total respectively. 
Figure 3.3: The pattern of European taxation 2002 
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Source: Based on OECD (2004). 
Because of this kind of problems of measuring the size of public sector, in 
1986 UK Public Expenditure White Paper selects the ratio of general 
government expenditure to gross domestic product (at market prices) as the 
suitable measure (Beeton, 1987). However, adjustments to the National 
Income Accounts definition of government expenditure need to be made in 
order for it to be an accurate measure of total expenditure actually incurred. 
When these adjustments are made, the public sector is discovered to be 
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larger, and growing more quickly than the Public Expenditure White Paper 
definition indicates. These adjustments could be made following different 
deflator indicators of public sector size, focusing on social expenditure 
(Mahler, 1992). Other authors, such as Karras (1997), abstract that the 
optimal government size for the representative European country is 
estimated by the study of the role of public services in the production 
process. The empirical results support the following conclusions: the 
optimal government size is 16% for the average European country, and the 
marginal productivity of government services may be negatively related to 
government size. 
Importance of Public Sector in Europe: 
In this part of our analysis it will be adapted, like measurement of the size of 
the public sector, the public expenditure in relation to the GDP of each 
country. Measured by the level of public expenditure, the weight of the 
public sector in the European Union, as it can be observed in table 3.1, is 
nowadays around 48.5% of the current GDP, like simple average of the 
European economies, surpassing in more than ten points to which it has in 
Japan, and twelve points and a half to which it reaches in the United States, 
which means a high dimension in comparison. However, there are important 
differences about this aspect among the EU countries. 
Table 3.1: Total public expenditure in the European countries 1980-2003 (as % of GDP) 
Countries 1980 1990 2000 2003 
Belgium 57.0 53.1 49.9 51.0 
Denmark 53.6 57.4 53.5 56.2 
Germany 48.0 45.3 45.9 48.8 
Greece 27.3 48.2 41.4 48.3 
Spain 32.9 43.9 40.0 39.6 
France 46.6 50.6 52.8 54.6 
Ireland 48.0 39.5 32.0 34.3 
Italy 42.9 54.3 46.5 49.0 
Luxembourg 50.4 46.0 40.1 44.9 
Netherlands 56.7 55.2 45.4 49.0 
Austria 47.8 50.2 51.9 50.8 
Portugal 41.0 40.1 44.6 47.8 
Finland 39.4 46.8 48.7 51.1 
Sweden 61.6 60.7 58.1 58.3 
United Kingdom 43.1 43.4 40.2 43.6 
European Union-15 46.2 48.9 47.0 48.5 
United States 34.5 36.7 32.7 35.7 
Japan 32.5 31.9 31.9 38.2 
Source: Eurostat (2004). 
 
 
Firstly, the relevance of the public sector is smaller in most of the countries 
of the south of the European Union (Spain, Portugal and Greece to be 
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precise), and also in Ireland and the United Kingdom. But the reasons of 
that smaller public presence among these two groups of countries do not 
seem to be the same. In the case of Southern countries, all of them receive 
important amounts of  EU structural and cohesion funds due to the their 
relative economic delay in GDP per capita and development. The case of the 
second ones, and mainly the United Kingdom, they link to a less 
interventionist conception from the public sector, closer to the North 
American scheme. In fact, the activity of Public Administrations in the 
countries of the Southern Union was still relatively more reduced in the 60s 
and 70s when also their levels of rent per head were relatively lower, having 
produced since then a process of convergence with the EU average, non-
single in rent per head, but also in the dimension of the public sector. 
However, the United Kingdom and Ireland are both countries in which the 
importance of the public activity has increased less in almost the forty years 
between 1960 and 2000, even though both have not followed parallel 
developments. Whereas in the United Kingdom a moderate raise of the 
public expenditure over the GDP is observed throughout this extensive 
period of time, in Ireland they oppose two evolutionary guidelines, having 
as a result a stagnation of the expenditure in the lowest level of the Union, 
34% of the GDP: after a fast increase of the numbers of the public activity 
from 1960 to 1986, to reaching 51% of the GDP in the last year, a gradual 
and continuous slowdown takes place until this moment, almost coincident 
in time with the high incomes of resources coming from the Found of 
Cohesion of the European Union and the common budget. It is important to 
notice that Ireland presents at the moment one of the highest levels of GDP 
within the European Union, and does not receive these funds. 
On the other hand, and due to the high importance of the public sector in 
their economies, it is important to put emphasis on France, Belgium and the 
Nordic countries, especially Sweden among them, where the weight of 
public expenditure over the GDP reaches 58.3% at present. In these 
countries the raise of the public expenditure has been almost as intense as in 
the Southern European countries, measured in percentage points over the 
GDP, but the departure level in the 60s was already very near the EU 
average. That is the reason why today the dimension of public activity in 
those countries it is so wide. 
In any case, with some exceptions such as France, the dominant trend in the 
EU countries has been of slowdown during the decade of the 90s, in contrast 
to the observed trend in other countries, such as Japan, New Zealand, 
Switzerland or Norway during the last years. The reasons of this 
development are, on one part, a less interventionist conception of the EU 
governments, which seem to share the idea that today an excessive 
dimension of the public sector can be an obstacle for the economic growth, 
in agreement with the results obtained in diverse theoretical and empirical 
researches (Doménech and García, 1999).  
On the other hand, within the limits established for the public deficits in the 
Pact of Stability and Growth signed in 1997 by all of them, that forces to 
finance the expansion of the public expenditure with new taxes, which is not 
easy because the tax levels in the European Union are already very high. For 
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that reason, it is not possible to expect that the countries of Southern Europe 
increase significantly their relative importance of public expenditure in the 
future. Apart from that, these countries should revise the composition of its 
public spending to orient it less towards subsidies and current spending, 
more towards investment and efficient spending.  
If instead of using the public expenditure as a measurement of the 
dimension of the public sector, the fiscal pressure or the current 
transferences to the households in relation to the GDP are used (table 3.2), 
similar results can be observed: the weight of the public sector in the 
European Union is higher than the one in the United States or Japan., The 
countries within the European Union belonging to the Found of Cohesion, 
together with the United Kingdom, are those that display lower levels. 
Table 3.2: Measurement indexes of the public sector in the European Union 2002(as % of GDP) 
Countries Total spending 
Public 
investment 
Total current 
expenditure 
Current 
transfers 
Fiscal 
pressure 
Social 
protection 
expenditure** 
Austria 49,9 1,2 49,0 18,7 43,9 29,1 
Belgium 53,5 1,6 55,9 15,3 45,7 27,8 
Denmark 45,9 1,7 44,7 17,1 50,4 30,0 
Finland 48,3 2,9 39,8 16,3 46,2 26,4 
France 40,0 3,2 39,2 18,0 45,8 30,6 
Germany 52,8 1,5 51,1 18,8 37,7 30,5 
Greece 32,0 3,9 29,6 16,3 37,1 26,6 
Ireland 46,5 3,9 46,6 8,2 32,3 16,0 
Italy 40,1 2,6 39,5 16,8 43,3 26,1 
Luxembourg 45,4 4,8 45,9 14,1 41,8 22,7 
Netherlands 51,9 3,6 47,9 11,9 42,1 28,5 
Portugal 44,6 3,4 39,4 12,1 34,3 25,4 
Spain 48,7 3,5 49,7 12,3 35,1 20,2 
Sweden 58,1 3,1 60,2 18,3 52,2 32,5 
United Kingdom 40,2 1,7 39,8 13,4 36,3 27,6 
European 
Union 47,0 2,4 45,6 15,2 41,6 28,0 
United States 34,5 1,6 33,2 12,6 28,9 - 
Japan 38,6 6,4 30,4 15,7 26,2 - 
*2003 - Source: Eurostat (2004). 
In general, and coincident with the fact happening with public expenditure, 
the fiscal pressure increased in the period between 1960 and 1986, and a 
slowdown or stagnation took place later. But differences among countries 
exist. On the one hand, it is important to emphasise the strong growth 
experienced by the Nordic countries (Sweden, Denmark and Finland) and 
Belgium, where starting off of intermediate levels in the 60s have reached at 
the moment the highest levels of fiscal pressure. On the other hand, the 
Mediterranean countries (Spain, Portugal and Greece), where they started 
off of the lowest levels, multiply by four the level of taxation in the analysed 
period of time. Finally, it is possible to show, by its economic core, the 
stability that the fiscal pressure has maintained in countries such as Japan 
and, specially the United States. 
The dimension of the public sector of the European Union as an institution 
can be measured by the percentage representing the budget of spending on 
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the EU GDP, which at the moment is of 1.27%. It implies that the public 
sector in the Union is quite lower than it is in other federations of states (the 
United States or Switzerland, with 20% and 25% of their GDP respectively). 
The reduced weight of the public sector of the European Union has been a 
long-debated question by experts in the matter, who, in an extensive report 
on public financing (McDouglas et al., 1977) establish as the lowest level of 
reference of the public sector within the federal scope the 5%, far enough of 
the present reality. At sight of these results, it could be concluded that, 
having in mind the weight of the public sector, the Union is nearer to which 
it is known as “pre-federal integration”, whose minimum level of reference 
for the public financing is set up in a 2%. 
Almost half of the EU spending is allocated for the Common Agrarian 
Policy (CAP), being the rest absorbed mainly by the economic and social 
cohesion policy. But a gradual loss of importance of the CAP has taken 
place in benefit of the economic and social cohesion policy. This has been 
caused by the reform of the CAP in 1992, “McSharry Reform”, and by the 
incorporation of less-developed countries to the Union, which has been 
translated in an increase of the differences of rent among the EU regions. 
Ahead the perspective of the new already signed extension to the Eastern 
countries, the economic and social cohesion policy is outlined like a still 
more important piece within the European Union. 
On the other hand, the EU funds are complementary to the national ones, 
following the principle of which the confluence of interests in both levels 
must contribute to the reinforcement of the policy at issue, and to the 
attainment of better aims. The EU spending, then, usually complements the 
national and regional ones, according to the existing distribution circuit. 
There is still a national preference over the supranational functioning, which 
is related to the importance of the principle of redistributive justice. 
However, while the different members of the European Union use their 
fiscal systems for the three classic functions: as stabiliser, to allocate and to 
redistribute (Musgrave, 1969), the common property has to develop without 
the first of them, whose basic utility is to incur public deficits, since the EU 
budget must be balanced. The redistributive function assumes then a core 
importance, since the differences of rent among the different regions widely 
surpass the interregional differences within each State member, and 
duplicate the existing maximum differences in other supranational 
structures, such as the United States.  
The existence of great disparities of interregional rent turns the 
redistributive function in an economic objective key in the European Union 
and leitmotiv of the economic and social cohesion policy. The function of 
allocating occupies, however, a second place, and its main instrument is the 
CAP. 
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Size and performance of the Public Sector and economic 
growth 
Most empirical studies on public sector performance assess either the 
relative performance of specific producing units (e.g. hospitals) against each 
other, frequently using frontier analysis, or broad sector aggregates (e.g. 
health, education, or administration), assessing performance over time or 
across countries. Lack of internationally harmonised data often prevents 
cross-country comparisons of public sector productivity across countries. 
Cross-country studies on public sector efficiency frequently rely on 
indicators such as the educational achievement of school pupils at a given 
age, life expectancy, survey results on how managers perceive the 
functioning of justice, the extent of the corruption in a given country, or 
macroeconomic indicators (such as GDP per head, economic growth or 
income distribution). 
Afonso et al. (2003) compute indicators of public sector performance 
(which describes the outcomes of public sector activity) and public sector 
efficiency (which relates the outcomes to resource use). To establish 
indicators to overall public sector performance, they use selected socio-
economic indicators for public administration, education, health, 
infrastructure, income distribution, economic stability and economic 
performance.  
Figure 3.4: Indicators of public sector efficiency and performance  
(axes: X = performance; Y = efficiency) 
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Source: Based on Afonso et al. (2003) 
Figure 3.4 shows the relation between public sector performance to the 
efficiency in the European countries, US and Japan. It can be observed how 
Luxembourg, Japan and the US report high performance at a low cost in 
terms of public spending. The Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Iceland 
report above-average performance in the public sector, but this is achieved 
at a disproportionately high cost in terms of public expenditure. The 
countries close to the average efficiency line combine low public spending 
with low performance (Greece, Portugal, Spain and the UK) or higher 
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performance with above-average spending levels (Norway, Austria, Ireland 
and Finland). Finally, Italy, France and Belgium, and to a lesser extent 
Germany, appear as relatively inefficient in their use of public resources, 
while they also score badly in terms of performance. Afonso et al. (2003) 
conclude that the higher performance and efficiency scores of small 
governments may suggest that the size of government could be too large in 
many industrialised countries, leading to the prevalence of declining 
marginal products.  
The performance of the public service sector in particular can be measured 
by the score on four public sector functions: stabilization and growth of the 
economy, distribution of welfare, allocation of public services and quality of 
public administration (table 3.3).  
Table 3.3: Indicators of the performance of the public service sector 
 Stabilization and 
growth of the 
economy 
Distribution of 
welfare 
Allocation of public 
services 
Quality of public 
administration 
Belgium 1.29 1.45 1.33 1.10 
Denmark 1.38 1.61 1.32 1.71 
Germany 1.13 1.61 1.16 0.93 
Greece 1.23 0.89 1.37 0.82 
Spain 1.27 1.05 1.32 1.26 
France 1.16 1.21 1.33 1.21 
Ireland 1.64 0.89 1.56 1.36 
Italy 1.13 1.05 1.25 0.87 
Luxembourg 1.72 1.53 1.15 1.66 
Netherlands 1.33 1.69 1.24 1.31 
Austria 1.37 1.53 1.34 1.39 
Portugal 1.27 0.81 1.01 1.08 
Finland 1.46 1.61 1.52 1.91 
Sweden 1.37 1.61 1.34 1.50 
United Kingdom 1.32 0.97 1.14 1.23 
EU-15 1.34 1.30 1.29 1.29 
United States 1.23 0.63 1.22 1.38 
 
Source: SCP (2004) 
Luxembourg and Ireland perform well in terms of stabilisation and growth. 
Of all EU-15 countries, Germany, France and Italy achieve the least 
satisfying results, mainly because of a rather poor performance on economic 
growth and budget deficits. New member states perform clearly less on the 
economic dimension, although their (with the exception of the Czech 
Republic) economic growth is high. The composite score indicating the 
quality of public administration shows a fairly wide range. Finland again 
has the higher score, followed by Denmark, Sweden and Luxembourg. 
Greece and Italy has the lowest scores. On allocation function of the public 
sector, Ireland and Finland score well above average. On the other hand, 
Portugal scores clearly below average. In terms of distribution of welfare, 
only the Scandinavian countries, Germany, and the Netherlands more or less 
make the Lisbon target (a poverty rate of 10%). Belgium, Luxembourg and 
Austria also have a fairly low poverty rate. A number of Southern European 
countries and the Anglo-Saxon ones record a poverty rate in excess of 18%. 
Table 3.3 offers a comprehensive overview of these performance indicators 
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The quest for economic growth is a third target seen as central to macro 
economics. Despite a large amount of theorising and empirical research the 
process of and recipe for economic growth has remained elusive. The focus 
of this analysis is rather more limited and is concerned with the connection 
between public sector size and economic growth. Clearly, economists of the 
Leviathan public choice school tend to support a view that sees a large 
public sector as detrimental to economic growth. In contrast, evidence of a 
correlation between GDP growth and the growth rate of government, and 
more weakly between GDP growth and the size of government (figure 3.5), 
have been associated with the argument that there is a strong positive 
externality between public and private sectors. 
Figure 3.5: Relation between economic growth and size of public sector in Europe, Government 
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Source: Eurostat (2004). 
In Europe, because of the creation of a single currency area and the 
disappearance of national monetary policies, the debate has focused on the 
role that national fiscal policies can play and the need for a fiscal federation. 
The permanent limits on budget deficits set by the Growth and Stability Pact 
have been criticised for not leaving enough room for fiscal policy to smooth 
output fluctuations (Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1998), although most 
economists agree with the Commission in the need of a certain stability Pact 
to guarantee coherence in the use of a common economic and monetary 
policy. 
Fatás and Mihov (2001) document a strong negative correlation between 
public sector size and output volatility, so larger public sectors indicate 
higher economic stability. He defines public sector size as the relation 
between government spending and GDP, although other measures are used, 
such as the relation between government spending and the total output, or 
taxes between total output. The importance of the relationship between the 
average size of public sector is, as mentioned, two-folded. First, there is 
evidence that across countries public sector size is strongly correlated with 
conventional measures of automatic stabilisers like elasticities of transfers 
and taxes or the progressiveness of the tax system. Second, going beyond 
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the effect of tax elasticities, the size of public sector spending might in itself 
be a significant determinant of the characteristics of business cycles. 
Studying the effects of government size is one of the possible ways of 
analysing the stabilising role of public sector and it does not take into 
consideration other dimensions of fiscal policy. There are, however, several 
reasons why it is found that looking at public sector size provides a good 
starting point for the analysis of the stabilising role of governments. First, it 
can be argued that as long as the public sector is the safe sector in the 
economy, increasing its size will reduce the overall volatility of the 
economy (Rodrik, 1998). Second, the measurement of cyclical elasticities of 
fiscal variables is a difficult task and requires additional assumptions to 
uncover the structural relationship between those variables and the business 
cycle. Lastly, public sector size can be a proxy for the overall level of 
stabilisation provided by fiscal policy. There is evidence that, across 
European countries, public sector size and automatic stabilisers are strongly 
correlated. 
The figure 3.6 reports a scatter plot of public sector size and the volatility of 
GDP for the sample of European Union countries. Public sector size is 
measured as the average ratio of government expenditure to GDP, and 
volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the growth rate of real 
GDP. Although no clear correlations stand at all, there might be some 
negative correlation under certain conditions for some countries, as first 
reported in Galí (1994).  
Figure 3.6: Relation between stability and size of public sector in Europe 
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Source: Eurostat (2004). 
There is also a question of size and minimum fringe. The goodness of a 
large public sector is clear when comparing developed countries with 
consolidated public sectors and developing countries where public sectors 
are very weak. In other words, developed countries can afford large public 
sectors after a stable and consolidate systems of public spending and taxes. 
However, when just only the most developed countries are considered, the 
size of public sector is not necessarily good for the economy. Different 
economic and social strategies coexist and the composition of public sector 
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becomes a fundamental question. Those countries reinforcing public 
investment and innovation, for example, perform much better than those 
reinforcing current spending, passive transfers and inefficient subsidies. 
These countries should move towards an ambitious program of structural 
and administrative and social reforms.  
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Fourth part: Public sector in the new EU member 
states 
Introduction 
Most of the countries that have asked for their adhesion to the EU have 
faced in the last years the transition from strongly interventionist economies 
towards a typical market model of the western European countries. At the 
present time, almost all the new EU member states register levels of public 
expenditure and income related to the GDP similar to those of the EU, 
although they are relatively high in comparison with other countries of 
similar levels of output.  
Figure 4.1: Public income and expenditure in the candidate countries, 2002 (as % of GDP)  
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Source: Eurostat (2004) 
The proportion of the public income and expenditure over the total 
production of the economy in these countries has been shown in figure 4.1. 
The information is in some cases referred, however, to different components 
from the Public Sector, the reason why the comparison among countries is 
difficult. These data indicate that the Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia and 
Estonia) are the States with a smaller percentage of public income and 
expenditure over the GDP. On the other hand, countries such as Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, present the higher 
levels. In comparison with the communitarian countries, the magnitude of 
the indicators of income and expenditure is lower. However, the size of the 
Public Sector in the post-communist countries is, in most cases, similar to 
which corresponds to the States members with a smaller level of public 
activity. 
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Following its evolution, it is easy to verify that public income and 
expenditure have followed very similar trends, except for Estonia and 
Lithuania in the scope of Central and Eastern Europe, and undoubtedly in 
the set of the Eastern Mediterranean countries, where the behaviour of both 
subjects throughout the time is more divergent. From the beginning of the 
90s to nowadays, the decreasing of the public sector size in this set of 
countries has been remarkable. This fact is showed by two basic indicators: 
Firstly, the public sector, which in planned economies dominated 
completely the production, has been replaced by the presence of the private 
sector (nowadays, the private sector represents more than half of the total 
production in these countries1). Secondly, a very significant percentage of 
the public firms have been privatized in the last years.  
The processes of privatization in these countries have constituted one of the 
main characteristics of these economies in the last years. In fact, the 
decreasing in the size of the public sector has been conditioned by the 
limitations of the transition towards market systems, but also by the need to 
reach a suitable fiscal discipline, threatened by the public firms. It is 
important to underline in this sense the Romanian case, in which their 
incapacity to follow their taxation obligations has supposed a source of very 
important macroeconomic unsteadiness.  
In general, the privatization process has had a remarkable importance, as 
much by its amplitude as by its depth. In the case of Estonia, Slovakia and 
Hungary, this process has practically been completed. In fact, all the small 
and medium companies have been given back to the private sector, and only 
a much reduced set of great companies must to privatize. On the other hand, 
in the Czech Republic the program of privatizations is being revitalized 
again, after a massive process of sale of medium and great companies that 
turned out to be problematic, since a great proportion of the actions were 
acquired by banks and national funds that failed in the enterprise 
reconstruction. Another group of countries, such as Poland, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Slovenia, has followed a slower process of privatizations, at 
least as for the great companies. Finally, of the set of countries of central 
and Eastern Europe candidates to the adhesion, the slowest in the process of 
privatizations are Bulgaria and Romania. However, and according to data of 
the European Commission, Bulgaria had privatized in 2000 more of 72% of 
assets belonging to old state firms. On the other hand, the difficulties that 
have taken place in the Romanian program of privatizations have been 
caused, basically, by the high levels of debt in state firms.  
Finally, the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean that have asked for their 
adhesion to the EU have developed processes of privatization of different 
intensity. Thus, Malta has been characterized by an intense process of 
privatizations, similar those followed in the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. Nevertheless, in Cyprus the public sector keeps handing activities 
                                                 
1 The participation of the private sector in the total output, measured as a percentage of the GDP, surpasses 
approximately 70% for half of this set of countries, such as the Czech Republic and Hungary, holding 80% of the 
total production in private hands. On the other hand, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria are shown such as the countries 
with worst levels, which do no surpass 60%. 
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that could be in deprived hands, and has been more reticent to deepen in the 
privatization program. Finally, in Turkey the income by privatizations only 
very recently has started to be important.  
The candidate countries to the adhesion have done, during the last years, 
important efforts in the profit of the macroeconomic stability. However, all 
of them have not obtained their objectives with the same degree of success. 
Thus, Bulgaria is the country that has reached a more important fiscal 
adjustment as a result of the strict discipline imposed by the monetary 
agreement, while Poland and Slovenia also have managed to maintain an 
important degree of fiscal stability. On the other hand, the Baltic countries 
have been seriously affected by the impact of the Russian crisis, with a 
reflection in their respective deficits; however, in the last years they have 
made a remarkable effort in this matter. Romania and Turkey still face the 
challenge to obtain this fiscal stability, although in the last case the program 
designed by the IMF would have force the reduction of the deficit of a 
significant way in the mid term. Finally, Cyprus and Malta have to face 
remarkable fiscal imbalances needing an urgent attention.  
Related to the public sector debt, it is relatively smooth for the set of 
candidate countries, except for Bulgaria and Turkey. In the first case, 
however, in the last two years it has taken place an important fall in the 
percentage of debt related to the GDP, as a result of the greater rate of 
growth of the economy and the efforts directed to the fiscal consolidation.  
As it is shown in figure 4.2, the fiscal policy of the last years has determined 
the present levels of public debt. Thus, those countries that have carried out 
reasonable policies, such as the Czech Republic, have obtained relatively 
reduced levels of debt. On the opposite hand, the accumulation of the fiscal 
deficits in other countries, such as Cyprus, has lead towards a continuous 
growth of the total debt. In general, the candidate countries have made 
considerable progresses in the cleaning of their economies. However, at this 
moment they maintain the commitment to get on with the process of fiscal 
consolidation and the structural reform of their public sectors. Although an 
important part of the way towards the convergence with the member states 
of the EU has already been covered, there is still much to advance.  
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Figure 4.2: Government deficit and gross debt in candidate countries, 2004 (% GDP) 
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*Government deficits are expressed in positive - Source: Eurostat (2004).  
The process of adhesion to the EU will change the volume of public 
expenditure and income of the involved countries, which, foreseeable, will 
be increased. In the scope of the public expenditure, the factors that press to 
the rise are many. Among them, it could be mentioned the need to fulfil the 
legal and institutional requirements ordered by the communitarian 
authorities, or the necessary approach to the environmental standards of the 
EU. In addition, most of these countries need to renew their infrastructures, 
and consequently, they will have to increase the public investment. Also, 
some of them have happened to belong to NATO, taking an agreement of 
increasing their defence spending in the next years, besides the expenditure 
that the reform of the social protection systems will suppose, affected 
seriously by the changes in the demographic structure.  
By the side of the public income, it is expected to the new member states 
have access to an important level of structural communitarian funds and 
subventions for the agricultural sector. Finally, the adhesion to the EU will 
affect to the general functioning of the public sector in the candidate 
countries, through the reinforcement of the institutions that is being carried 
out in the previous stage. Due to this, the levels of efficiency could reach 
some improvements in the administration of the expenditures and taxes of 
the public sector.  
The social protection in New Member States: 
In the last decade, the Central and Eastern European countries that have 
asked for their adhesion to the EU have experienced important economic 
and social transformations related to the transition process from strongly 
interventionist economies to models of market economies. The budgetary 
pressures in these countries have been remarkable (especially in the middle 
of the 90s), and have resulted in the appearance of serious problems in the 
configuration of social protection systems. This trend continued until 1998, 
when a generalized improvement of the public finances took place and 
 41
many reforms began in the systems of expenditure management, which 
made also possible the recovery of the current expenditures and, in many 
cases, the profit of suitable levels of social expenditure.  
On the other hand, the perspective of the adhesion to the EU has forced to 
those countries to undertake important reforms during the last years, not 
only in their income sources (specially in their taxation systems), but also in 
the expenditure policies, with the purpose of obtaining a sustainability in the 
mid term and reaching models of social protection next to the 
communitarian ones. In general, the former schemes were characterized by 
the universal cover of the benefits, the presence of generous familiar 
allocations, varied options of anticipated retirement and free provision of 
health care. Those elements remain almost intact after the transition to a 
system of market economy, although modifications in the programmes of 
unemployment insurance and social welfare have been introduced with the 
purpose of helping the families to surpass the shocks derived from the 
transition process. 
Social attendance policies in these countries are made up of a great number 
of programs of larger amplitude than the ones designed within the scope of 
the EU. In addition to the traditional benefits, diverse aids by spending in 
energy, monthly rents against the poverty, subsidies for transports, etc... are 
included. Although they are accustomed to be more generous in comparison 
with the international standards, they usually are badly managed, reason 
why they can not always fulfil their objective to light the worst situations of 
need. In addition, the management of the benefits is carried out by a 
multitude of varied institutions, which contribute to the duplicity of the 
expenditures and an increase of inefficiency in the allocation of public 
resources.  
Referring to the main social benefits (their average social protection pattern 
is shown in figure 4.3) offered by this set of countries, it is suitable to 
underline some typical characteristics, although the proportions of each type 
of expenditure are very close to those in EU-25. Firstly, the established 
systems of pensions as distribution systems were initially designed with a 
highly complex and differentiated structure of benefits, that generated 
strong administrative problems, and with flexible criteria in the definition of 
the beneficiaries of the benefits. Also, the incentives to the anticipated 
retirement tended to increase the number of beneficiaries in relation to the 
number of contributors. Besides, there was much reduced contribution basis 
in comparison with the industrial countries, partly by the low proportion of 
the wages on the total repayment, and partly by the exemptions granted to 
certain types of workers. At this moment, the percentage of contributions on 
the GDP varies among countries, which suggests that the success in the 
extension of the contribution basis and the reinforcement of the fiscal 
fulfilment carried out in the last years have been different among countries. 
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Figure 4.3: Social protection pattern in New Member States, 2001 
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Furthermore, the health systems structure is very similar in all the 
economies in transition. During the socialist period, extensive systems 
settled down, with universal and free accesses, which have undergone few 
structural changes during the transition. Between 1992 and 1996, the health 
expenditures underwent an important fall, specially the capital expenditures, 
and from 1997 on, they showed a slow recovery that has not always resulted 
in the increase of levels of suitable spending. Some countries, such as 
Bulgaria, Poland and Romania, continue financing the health expenditures 
with general taxes, while in other cases, such as in the Czech Republic and 
Hungary, systems based on the collection of social contributions have 
settled down.  
The factors pressing on social expenditure are diverse: firstly, an increasing 
need of social transferences is registered due to structural unemployment 
and the increase in the demand of retirement pensions. On the other hand, 
important changes are forecasted in the long term within the demographic 
structure that will affect to the pensions system, with increases in the rate of 
dependency, and to the health expenditure. These problems, common to the 
EU countries, get deeper by some own circumstances of the economies in 
transition, that have inherited an unsuitable infrastructure and human capital 
for a market system and registered low levels of productivity referred to the 
international standards. 
In addition, its structure to collect taxes is very limited, and the need for 
social protection is greater than in other countries due to the increase of the 
poverty in the last years and the high expectations generated by the 
programs of social welfare during the socialist period. Therefore, it is 
necessary to reduce the size of the social protection schemes to be able to 
reduce the fiscal pressure and to allow the growth of other spending, 
considering the need of a suitable level of social expenditure to mitigate the 
effects of the transition process on the poor people.  
Considering this, the profit of the fiscal policy objectives will require a 
careful evaluation of the expenditure and its structure. The rationalization of 
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the functions and the size of the public sector can help to improve the 
efficiency, to reduce the public personnel and to save money in the mid 
term. Until now, the reforms established in the last years have been 
designed with the short-term objective to rationalize programs of social 
protection and manage them suitably. In any case, it is necessary to extend 
the strategy of reform of the expenditure, especially within the scope of 
retirement pensions, which constitute the more expensive program within 
the social protection systems. 
However, whatever it is the type of reform designed, the countries that have 
asked for their adhesion to the EU will have to continue with the trend of 
approach to the social protection programs of the communitarian countries, 
with the purpose of making their process of integration easier. In any case, 
the adoption of the communitarian rules and the basic attachment lines 
designed by the member states of the EU in the scope of social protection 
will mean for these countries a step ahead in the configuration of a suitable 
economic policy, which will also allow improving its economic results.  
Tax systems in New Member States 
Central and Eastern Europe countries 
In most of these countries the percentage of the tax income over the GDP 
registered significant reductions since 1990. According to the numbers 
shown in the table 4.1, this indicator decreased yet between 1995 and 2000, 
except for the case of Latvia and Lithuania, which experienced a slight 
recovery of the tax collection. Bulgaria and Romania, however, have 
registered the most remarkable reductions during the last years, while 
Poland, after experiencing a strong slow-down in the tax income between 
1990 and 1991, begins to recover slowly, although without reaching the 
previous levels to 1990. In comparison with the numbers shown for the EU, 
the percentage that tax income represent over the GDP is lesser than the 
communitarian average, although approximately half of this group of 
countries (Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and the Czech Republic) shows 
similar or upper levels than those of the member states with lower 
percentage (Spain, Greece, Ireland and Portugal).  
On the other hand, the relative weight of personal income taxes between 
1995 and 2000 experienced a slow-down trend. The percentage that these 
resources implies over the GDP is very below the communitarian average, 
and generally near the corresponding numbers to Greece, France, Portugal 
and Spain, that are the member states whose collection by this concept is 
smaller. Besides, the percentage referred to the tax on the enterprise benefits 
display greater similarities with the ones of the UE. In this case, a common 
evolution for all the countries is not registered, since decreasing behaviours 
as increasing ones in the percentages throughout the second half of the 
nineties are clearly observed. 
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Table 4.1: Economic dimension of tax income, 2001 (% GDP) 
 Tax Receipts Personal Income 
Corporate 
Income 
Social 
Security 
Taxes on 
goods and 
services 
Other 
Bulgaria 26,6 4 5 6,9 10,3 0,4 
Slovakia 32,3 3,5 2,2 11,3 10,7 4,6 
Slovenia - - - - - - 
Estonia 37,1 8,5 2,6 12,1 12,6 1,3 
Hungary 39 7,6 2,4 11,4 15,1 2,5 
Latvia 40,6 4,2 2,4 11,3 12 10,7 
Lithuania 33,5 5,7 1,4 12,9 12,1 1,4 
Poland 40 8,8 3 12,9 13,4 1,9 
Czech Republic 38,4 4,8 4,2 15,0 11,7 2,7 
Romania 26,8 5,6 4,3 7,1 7,7 2,1 
Cyprus 24,6 - - 4,9 - - 
Malta 27,4 4,8 3,2 6,5 8,5 4,4 
Turkey 36,5 7,8 2,4 6,5 14,1 5,7 
 
 Source: OECD (2004). 
Regarding the Social Security contributions, its relative weight is greater 
than in both previous cases, agreeing with the guideline followed by the EU 
countries. To a larger extent, these countries show similar percentages to 
those of the set of member states, being Bulgaria and Romania, around 7%, 
the most distant from the communitarian average (11%).  
As for indirect taxes, the relative weight of the taxes on the sales is similar 
or upper than the communitarian average, except in Romania, where they 
have a remarkably smaller relative importance. Moreover, the percentages 
referred to special taxes are situated, approximately in half of the cases, 
below the average of the EU, and oscillate between 1.7% in Romania and 
4% in Poland. Finally, the relative weight of the tax income derived from 
the international trade differs remarkably among countries. The percentage 
shown in the table indicate that these income represent a proportion of the 
GDP lower than the one corresponding to special taxes, but generally upper 
than the communitarian average.  
The decrease of the tax income that has taken place in this set of countries 
since the beginning of the nineties has been conditioned by the effects of the 
economic recession and the financial crisis derived from the transition to a 
market system economy. The persistence of high rates of inflation has 
originated important losses in the real value of the income collection, and a 
generalized deterioration in the rates of fulfilment has taken place. The 
delays in the adaptation of the tax schemes to the changing economic 
surroundings have been very expensive, especially if it has in mind that the 
measures have consisted on measures of fiscal policy not accompanied by 
reforms in the tax administration, which has contributed to reduce its 
effectiveness.  
In the middle of the last decade an introduction of reforms for the re-
conversion of those fiscal systems towards a model of market economies 
began. A good example is the substitution of the tax on the sales by taxes on 
the added value. Also, at the end of the nineties, they were introduced 
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reforms to impel the transparency of the fiscal system and to obtain a 
financial sustainability in the mid term in these countries.  
Within the scope of the direct taxes, the last reforms that have been carried 
out in these countries have been directed, firstly, to simplify and extend the 
taxes basis, to reduce the marginal types and to articulate solutions for the 
distortions caused by inflation. Secondly, reforms in the taxes on personal 
income have been gotten up leading towards a tax on the global income 
(through the elimination of extensions and deductions). In order to face with 
the excessive fiscal load that falls on the labour factor, common problem to 
the economies of the member states of the European Union, the last reforms 
have the objective of reaching an additional reduction in the marginal types 
of the tax on the personal income and a cut of the social contributions, 
together with an increase of the tax basis of these latter.  
At the present time, the structure of the corresponding tariff to the taxes on 
the personal income in these countries tends to converge with which 
correspond to the communitarian scope.  
Then, within the framework of indirect taxes, important reforms have also 
been carried out, consisting basically on walking towards the homologation 
of the taxes on the added value to the communitarian rules (as much in tax 
types as in procedures), and on the convergence of the taxes on specific 
goods towards the levels of the EU. Recently, Romania has incorporated an 
ambitious fiscal reform that has consisted on the unification of the types of 
the VAT and the increase of the burdensome basis of the taxes on specific 
consumptions, together with a slope of their types. Slovakia, on the other 
hand, is moving the load of the direct taxes to the indirect ones, as result of 
a slowdown in the taxes on the personal income and an increase in special 
taxes. Slovenia has introduced the VAT in 1999, together with a new system 
of special taxes. 
Finally, also the reforms that have been introduced in the scope of 
administrative procedures are numerous. Thus, it has tended to simplify the 
administrative structure (although in many cases it continues being 
excessively complex), it have been reinforced the controls to avoid fiscal 
frauds, the development of audit has been impelled and mechanisms of 
improvement in the information about taxes have been developed. This has 
tried compensating partially the loss of the tax collection derived from the 
slopes in the tax types. 
East Mediterranean countries 
As for these countries, the relative volume of the tax income is still less than 
in the rest of the candidate countries. Nevertheless, following the trend of 
those countries, the indirect taxes constitute the tax figures with greatest 
collecting power. 
In this set of countries, the evolution undergone by the tax systems in 
Turkey and Malta is especially remarkable. In the case of Turkey the 
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increases in the tax collection that took place in the second half of the 
nineties, derived from an increase in the wages and the retentions on the 
saving interests, and from an increase in the consumption, were limited by 
the weakness of the tax administration. At the present time, the fraud is 
much extended as a result of the low sanctions and the expectations of fiscal 
amnesties, which reduce the fulfilment of the tax obligations. 
Furthermore, Malta has introduced significant changes in its tax system 
during the last decade, including a reform in the structure of the taxes on the 
personal income and in the scope of indirect taxes. The success of this tax 
reform has been outstanding: the income has increased and the taxes basis 
has been remarkably extended. At present, the tax system in Malta is close 
to those of the EU countries, since the necessary structural reforms have 
already been boarded. 
In general, most of the countries put forward as candidates to the adhesion 
has adopted ambitious tax reforms during the last two decades, following 
the trends characteristic of the member states. Nevertheless, the total 
integration of this set of economies in the European Union demands deeper 
reforms. It is also necessary that this reform process of the tax 
administration gets completed if it is chosen at acceptable levels of tax 
collection, given the higher needs of public expenditure in those countries. 
The effects of the next adhesion will have a net positive effect on the 
income of those economies: Income will be reduced as a result of the 
contributions to the communitarian budget, the rights of customs will be 
reduced and the administrative expenditures will be increased, all of which 
will arise from the need to establish new procedures. Also, some changes 
which these countries must face will be associated to substantial increases of 
the costs: for instance, it will be necessary to increase the expenditure of 
investment in order to stimulate regional development, reconstruct the legal 
system, reach the environmental standards demanded by the EU, to improve 
the transport and communications networks, rebuild companies and the 
Bank, or modify the social protection systems. Nevertheless, it is likely the 
volume of transferences of the European Union (arising from the CAP, the 
structural Found of Cohesion and structural funds) and the greater tax 
collection coming from an increase of the production (through taxes on 
personal income and TAV) to  compensate the negative effects of the 
adhesion. 
Other Policies on Public Expenditure and Income in New 
Member States 
The structure and composition of public expenditure in this group of 
countries are determined by the change of the economic system in which 
they have been immersed during the last decade. In most of the economies 
in transition, public expenditure represents a very high percentage of the 
GDP. However, the spending levels have not reached the standards of the 
EU yet, and their structure is far from being suitable: while the public 
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investment is very low, the expenses in wages and transfers (above all those 
destined to social programs) are very high.  
The budgetary pressures suffered by those countries in the last years have 
been basically solved with two kind of measures: firstly, through 
adjustments in the most discretionary divisions of public expenditures, such 
as defence, industrial or agricultural subsidies, or public investment in 
general; secondly, by means of important delays in the payment of wages 
and transferences, so the level of public debt has risen notably.  
Since the transition towards a market economy model began, a process of 
slow transference of certain responsibilities of expenditure towards the local 
and regional governments has taken place in some of those countries (such 
as educative or house spending). However, these actions have not always 
been accompanied by enough monetary transference, which has lead to a 
deterioration of regional and local budgets. Nowadays, many governments 
are carrying out institutional reforms intending to rationalize the operations 
of the Public Sector and to reinforce the intergovernmental fiscal relations.  
Besides the consolidation of the relations among the different government 
levels, the rationalization of the Public Administration in these countries 
requires a new global concept of expenditure. This revision must be 
concentrated in pointing out the main objectives (specially identifying key 
investment projects around the scope of infrastructures and environment), 
eliminating some functions that had been handled by the public sector so 
far, and reducing the number of public employees and reforming them. 
Also, it is necessary to reinforce the control systems of public expenditure, 
that in many cases are basically limited at the state level, without affecting 
the rest of lower levels. Most of those countries have already started 
successfully to perform these kinds of reforms.  
In many cases that group of countries has the technical attendance of 
international institutions, as the World Bank, to reach more modern ways of 
management and structures of public expenditure. Moreover, the EU has 
begun in 2000 to offer financial support to those countries, directed to 
environmental and infrastructural projects, through the Structural Policies 
Instrument for the Pre-adhesion, aiming to facilitate the economic 
conditions necessary to belong to the Union.  
This process of convergence, nevertheless, will require a period of 
adaptation in the behaviour of public sectors, who originally respond to very 
different economic and political contexts. Considering the quantitative 
importance of some relevant policies to emphasize the public sector 
performance in the European countries, such as the public expenditure in 
education, health or defence, it can be observed great differences yet.  
Final remarks: Comparison with EU member countries 
In the last years, all the candidate countries have faced a strong transition 
from strongly interventionist economies towards market models. Due to this 
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development, at present they register levels of public income and 
expenditure related to the GDP similar to those of the EU, although they are 
relatively high compared to other countries of similar levels of output.  
As it can be observed in table 4.2, that group of countries present an 
economic situation worse than present member countries’. Only Cyprus 
shows a GDP per capita level similar to the EU average (around 85%). 
Slovenia’, Czech Republic’ and Malta’s levels are between 50 and 75% of 
the EU average, while most of the candidate countries show economic 
levels under the half of EU average. Other countries, such as Romania, has 
levels under 25% of the EU average, very far from the top economic 
European countries, such as Luxembourg, Denmark, Belgium, the 
Netherlands or Ireland. 
In contrast, those candidate countries have shown in the year 2000 higher 
GDP growth rates than the EU average (3.3 points related to previous year). 
Only Slovakia, Czech Republic and Romania had lower rates that year. This 
fact opens the door to a possible future convergence with present EU 
member countries. 
Table 4.2: Economic and Public Sector level of candidate countries related to EU average(2000) 
Economic Indicators Public Finances (%GDP)  GDPpc GDP growth Density population Public income Public expenditure 
Bulgaria 6083 5,8 74 40,3 41,2 
Slovakia 10814 2,2 82 27,8 29,7 
Slovenia 15546 4,6 130 43,1 43,9 
Estonia 8336 6,9 33 36 40,7 
Hungary 11265 5,2 108 43,6 47,4 
Latvia 6534 3,9 37 36,5 40,1 
Lithuania 7435 6,6 57 32,9 40,7 
Poland 8787 4 1234 21,1 23,2 
Czech 
Republic 13293 2,9 124 38,8 40,3 
Rumania 5407 1,6 94 17,9 20,5 
Ciprus 19150 4,8 110 31,9 36,9 
Malta 12391 5,4 98 34,9 43,5 
Turkey 5858 7,2 84 23,9 21,8 
EU-15 22530 3,3 118 44,6 42,3 
 
>100% 75-100% 50-75% 25-50% <25% 
  
Source: Eurostat (2004) and OECD (2001) 
If it is observed their evolution, the public income and expenditure of those 
candidate countries have followed very similar trends, except for Estonia 
and Lithuania. From the beginning of the nineties to the present, the 
decreasing of the public sector size has been remarkable. This fact is shown 
by two basic indicators: the privatisation processes of public firms and the 
greater presence of the private sector in the national production. 
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Related to the public sector debt, it is relatively smooth for the set of 
candidate countries, except for Bulgaria and Turkey, although in the first 
case, an important fall in the percentage of debt has taken place as a result 
of the greater rate of growth of the economy and the efforts directed to the 
fiscal consolidation. 
As it is shown in table 4.3, the fiscal policy of the last years has determined 
the present levels of public debt. Thus, the accumulation of the fiscal 
deficits has lead towards a continuous growth of the total debt. Although in 
general the candidate countries have made considerable progresses in the 
cleaning of their economies, they maintain at this moment the commitment 
to get on with the fiscal consolidation process and the structural reform of 
their public sectors, because only Estonia, Bulgaria, Slovenia and Latvia 
present government deficits under 3% (level settled by the Stability and 
Growth Pact of the European Union). The other candidate countries are over 
this level, and some of them, such as Slovakia, Malta and Turkey, are over 
6% and 11% respectively, very far from the necessary levels of admission to 
the EU. 
Table 4.3: Government deficit in candidate countries related to EU levels (2000) 
 Bulgaria Slov-akia 
Slov-
enia Estonia Hungary Latvia
Lithu-
ania Poland
Czech 
Republic 
Rom-
ania Cyprus Malta Tukey
Government 
Deficit (%) 0.7 6.7 2.3 0.7 3.1 2.7 3.3 3.5 4.2 3.8 3.2 6.6 11
 
EU levels < 3% 3% < x < 6% > 6% 
  
Source: Eurostat (2004) and OECD (2001) 
As it has been shown, the social protection system in those countries has 
suffered a huge transformation linked to the social and economic transition 
which they have undergone since the nineties. The former schemes were 
characterized by the universal cover of the benefits, the presence of 
generous familiar allocations, varied options of anticipated retirement and 
free provision of health care. These elements remain almost intact after the 
transition to market economies, although modifications in the programmes 
of unemployment insurance and social welfare have been introduced, with 
the purpose of helping the householders to surpass the shocks resulting from 
this process. 
In order to manage these social needs, the tax systems are very important in 
those countries. However, the taxes over the GDP have decreased since 
1990 to get a similar system to the EU present members. So, one of the most 
important aims of that group of countries is to solve this two-fold matter in 
the coming years. In comparison with the numbers shown for the EU, the 
percentage of taxes over the GDP is less than the communitarian average, 
although Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and the Czech Republic show 
similar or upper levels than those of the member states with lower 
percentage, such as Greece, Spain, Ireland or Portugal. 
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Regarding Social Security contributions, their relative weight is greater than 
the one of income taxes, agreeing with the guideline followed by the EU 
countries. To a larger extent, those countries show similar percentages to 
those of the set of member states, being Bulgaria, Malta and Romania 
(around 7%), Cyprus and Turkey (around 4%), and Slovakia (2.8%) the 
most distant of the communitarian average (11% of the GDP).  
In the case of indirect taxes, their relative weight is similar or upper than the 
communitarian average, except in Romania. And lastly, the percentage of 
special taxes is also below the EU average, like in most of the other indirect 
taxes. But the effects of the future adhesion will have a net positive effect on 
the income of these economies, so the tax system will must be reformed. 
In conclusion, the structure and composition of the public expenditure and 
income in that set of countries are determined by the change of the 
economic system in which they have been immersed during the last years. 
This process has originated important budgetary pressures, which have been 
solved through fiscal adjustments and an increase of public debt. However, 
whatever the type of reform is, the candidate countries will have to go on 
with the trend of approach to the structure and performance to the 
communitarian countries, with the purpose of making integration easier. In 
any case, the adoption of the communitarian rules and the basic attachment 
lines designed by the EU will mean a step forward in the configuration of a 
suitable performance of the public sector, which will also allow improving 
their economic results. 
Final remarks 
The modern public sector is a consequence of a long and even controversial 
process where different organisational models, sizes and profiles have been 
evolved. But, in any case, the State is actively present in social and 
economic life. Economic life constantly depends on the economic decisions 
of the governments, which can be illustrated in the taxes we pay. Almost 
everybody, receive at any time transferences from the government, such as 
the Social Security programmes. An important quote of the workers is paid 
by the State or produce goods betrayed by the public sector. Many children 
go to public schools, everybody enjoy public parks, highways and other 
services or infrastructures. More recently, many people are interested in the 
public politics from the environmental point of view, as the authority in 
charge of preserving natural resources and promoting sustainable 
development. 
The structure, size and performance of the public sector is subject to 
generally fiery debate in Europe. Whereas, in the 1990s other aspects 
received a great deal of attention, in recent years the focus has shifted to 
failing public sector performance and behaviour. Thus, the aim of this report 
has been to present the basic figures and economic dimensions of public 
sector in the European countries, related to other main economies, such as 
United States and Japan. In addition, it intends to be an introductory 
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contribution to the PUBLIN project because the study of innovation in 
public sector can be introduced by a preliminary analysis about its structure, 
role and basic economics. This is particularly important in a Europe where 
different models, sizes, and organisational ways do exist. The significance 
and impacts of innovation in public administrations will be affected by 
differences in their sizes, performances, and socio-economic organisations. 
By adopting the Lisbon Agenda, member states of the European Union set 
themselves in 2000 the daunting task of making the Union the most 
competitive economic area in the world. Four years on, it seems 
increasingly doubtful whether this ambitious mission can be successfully 
completed. Anyway, the pattern and performance of the public sector of 
national economies is a crucial factor in the race to achieve the goals 
included in the Lisbon Agenda. Countries can try to improve the functioning 
of their public sector by adopting best practices found in other nations. The 
present report has been written with these purposes in mind. It had 
compared the structure, size and performance of the public sector (in 
general) in the twenty five nowadays EU member states, United States and 
Japan, tracing the differences (in terms of public figures, performance, 
welfare state and social protection structures, culture and administrative 
systems, and role of public sector in the aggregate economy) of all countries 
concerned, and identifying institutional factors that might help explain the 
differing performance of nations. 
Many definitions can be found of the term ‘public sector’ in economic 
literature (legal, financial and functional are the most extended ones), but in 
this report the functional one has been applied. The role of public sector is 
performance a number of tasks which cannot simply be left to the market, 
such us the provision of ‘public goods’ and other ‘private goods’ with major 
externalities, the equitable distribution of the incomes, the achievement of 
economic growth and stability,… And like most large organisations, the 
public sector operates at many levels (general, regional and local). Growing 
demands and declining confidence in public sector have prompted 
governments to initiate structural policies aimed at trimming the public 
sector and increasing its efficiency and effectiveness. Reform strategies 
adopted can be catalogued as maintain, modernise, marketise and minimise 
the public sector structure and organisation. 
Although all countries in the European Union have their own specific 
features with respect to their arrangements, it is possible to classify most 
countries into five general welfare state regimes. Three of them are 
comparable with those originally discussed by Esping-Andersen in his book 
‘The three worlds of welfare capitalism’ (1990) and are also supported by 
other analyses: the Nordic or social-democrat, the Continental or corporatist, 
and the Anglo-Saxon or liberal regimes. Diverse studies on administrative 
systems and cultures in Europe agree at some extent with these country 
clusters. Thus, Denmark, Sweden and Finland are placed into the Nordic 
group, while Germany, France, Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg emerged 
as Continental countries. The UK and Ireland, along with other non 
European countries such as United States, Canada or Australia, belong to 
the Anglo-Saxon states.  
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Besides the three regimes suggested by Esping-Andersen, two others can be 
identified. In line with the theoretical observations of several authors, there 
is a Mediterranean or Latin regime, represented by Spain, Greece, Portugal 
and Italy. When this classification was developed, no attention was paid to 
the former Eastern Bloc countries. However, Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had joined the 
EU in 2004, as well as Cyprus and Malta. These countries can be clustered 
into another different group, although with similar characteristics to other 
regimes in some aspects. Finally, two countries can be identified as 
‘hybrid’. The Netherlands is classified between the Continental and Nordic 
regimes, while Norway has both Nordic and Anglo-Saxon features. 
It is observed that general government size and its growth can be modelled 
no only in terms of demand-side theories, but also in terms of supply-side 
ones and institutional factors based theories. Although the role of size of the 
public sector in the performance and evolution of the economy has been 
largely treated in the economic literature, it is demonstrated the existence of 
so known difficulties on measuring the size and importance of public sector. 
Measured through the level of the public expenditure or any other indicator 
the results are similar. The weight of the public sector in the European 
countries is at the moment around the 48% of the current GDP, surpassing 
clearly to which it has in Japan and United States. This supposes a high 
dimension of the public sector. However, important differences among 
countries exist in this aspect. The relevance of the public sector is smaller in 
most Southern and Anglo-Saxon European countries (Spain, Greece, 
Portugal, Ireland and United Kingdom). In the other side, they can be found 
countries such as France, Belgium and the Nordic ones (especially Sweden), 
with higher numbers of the public sector. In any case, with some exceptions 
such as France, the dominant trend in the EU has been, during the 1990s, a 
decline in the size of the public sector, in contrast with the observed trend in 
other countries, such as Japan, Switzerland or Norway. 
Finally, in terms of performance of the public sector, moderate differences 
can be found across European countries. Unsurprisingly, countries with 
small public sectors report the best economic performance while countries 
with large public sectors show more equal income distribution. When 
weighting performance by the resources used to achieve it, there are 
important differences across countries. Thus, countries with small public 
sectors report significantly higher public sector efficiency indicators than 
countries with medium-sized or big public sectors. All these findings 
suggest diminishing marginal products of higher public spending. 
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1. Public Sector Figures: 
Table A.1: Government sector data, 2002 (as % of GDP) 
 
% Revenue % Expenditure 
% Final 
consumption 
% Social 
Security 
transfers 
% Net 
saving 
% Net 
lending 
Belgium 50.5 50.5 22.3 16.1 0.5 0.0 
Denmark 57.4 55.8 26.3 17.5 1.0 1.6 
Germany 45.0 48.5 19.2 19.4 -2.3 -3.5 
Greece 45.3 46.8 15.7 16.4 2.2 -1.5 
Spain 39.9 39.9 17.8 12.3 2.6 -0.1 
France 50.2 53.5 23.9 18.0 -1.9 -3.3 
Ireland 33.1 33.3 15.1 8.4 2.9 -0.1 
Italy 45.6 48.0 19.0 17.0 -0.7 -2.4 
Luxembourg 46.7 44.0 17.8 15.6 6.2 2.7 
Netherlands 45.9 47.5 24.5 11.8 -0.8 -1.6 
Austria 50.9 51.3 18.4 18.6 1.5 -0.4 
Portugal 43.2 45.9 21.2 13.0 -2.2 -2.7 
Finland 54.4 50.1 21.7 16.8 4.6 4.3 
Sweden 58.1 58.3 28.1 17.5 0.5 -0.3 
United Kingdom 39.4 40.7 20.1 13.5 -0.5 -1.3 
EU-15 47.0 47.6 20.7 15.5 0.9 -0.6 
Iceland 44.9 46.0 25.5 7.9 2.1 -1.1 
Norway 57.6 47.5 21.8 14.8 11.1 10.1 
United States 32.6 35.7 15.6 12.1 -2.2 -3.1 
Japan 30.3 38.2 17.7 10.9 -4.8 -7.9 
Israel* 49.1 48.8 27.7 11.7 0.3 -2.4 
 
Table A.2: Size of Public Sector in Europe, 2003 (as % of GDP) 
*2000 instead of 2003 - Source: Based on Eurostat (2004 
 
 General Government output 
Final Consumption 
Expenditure of General 
Government* 
Government investment 
Belgium 17.1 22.8 1.6 
Denmark 28.4 26.6 1.7 
Germany 13.2 19.2 1.5 
Greece 17.5 16.0 3.9 
Spain 16.4 17.9 3.5 
France 22.0 24.3 3.2 
Ireland 15.5 15.9 3.9 
Italy 18.3 19.5 2.6 
Luxembourg 15.0 18.2 4.8 
Netherlands 20.3 25.4 3.6 
Austria 15.1 18.0 1.2 
Portugal 20.9 21.3 3.4 
Finland 25.3 22.2 2.9 
Sweden 29.6 28.3 3.1 
United Kingdom 22.9 20.9 1.7 
EU-15 19.0 21.0 2.4 
Israel** 14.3 27.7 1.4 
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 Table A.3: Growth of size in public sector (annual average accumulative 
growth rates, in %) 
General Government 
output 
Final 
Consumption 
Expenditure 
of General 
Government 
Government 
investment  
1995-2003 1995-2003 1995-2003 
Belgium 0.4 0.8 -2.1 
Denmark 0.4 0.4 -0.7 
Germany -1.3 -0.4 -5.2 
Greece 0.6 0.6 2.5 
Spain -0.4 -0.1 -0.7 
France 0.1 0.2 -0.4 
Ireland -0.9 -0.5 6.8 
Italy 0.8 1.1 2.7 
Luxembourg -1.3 -0.1 0.5 
Netherlands 0.3 0.7 2.3 
Austria -3.9 -1.4 -10.8 
Portugal 1.2 1.7 -1.1 
Finland -0.6 -0.3 0.4 
Sweden -0.3 0.5 -3.1 
United Kingdom 1.0 0.9 -3.2 
EU-15 0.1 0.2 -1.0 
Israel* - 5.6 -5.1 
*2000 instead of 2003.  Source: Based on Eurostat (2004 
Table A.4: Public expenditure by type, 2003(As % of total) 
 General public 
services 
Defence
Health Education Total 
Belgium 9.6 1.2 7.0 6.3 51.0 
Denmark 8.1 1.6 5.8 8.5 56.2 
Germany 6.3 1.2 6.5 4.1 48.8 
Greece 9.1 3.6 2.9 3.6 48.3 
Spain - - - - - 
France 6.3 3.0 7.9 6.3 55.2 
Ireland 7.3 1.1 6.2 5.1 41.6 
Italy 9.1 1.3 6.5 5.2 49.0 
Luxembourg 4.9 0.3 5.3 5.4 45.5 
Netherlands 8.0 1.5 4.7 5.2 49.0 
Austria 7.5 0.9 6.6 5.8 50.8 
Portugal 7.5 1.3 7.1 7.0 47.9 
Finland - - - - - 
Sweden 7.9 2.1 7.3 7.4 58.5 
United Kingdom 4.8 2.7 6.8 5.3 43.5 
EU-15 8.8 1.9 5.9 5.6 51.9 
Israel* 12.6 7.8 5.6 26.0 
*2000 - Source: Based on Eurostat (2004) 
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Table A.5: Growth of public expenditure by type in Europe, 1995-2003 
(annual average accumulated growth rates) 
*2000 instead 2003 - Source: Based on Eurostat (2004) 
 
Table A.6: Public Debt and public deficit/surplus, 2003 (% of GDP) 
 
Gross Consolidated 
Public Debt 
Budget deficit/surplus  
Belgium 100.7 0.4 
Denmark 45.9 0.3 
Germany 64.2 -3.8 
Greece 109.9 -4.6 
Spain 50.7 0.4 
France 63.7 -4.1 
Ireland 32.1 0.1 
Italy 106.2 -2.4 
Luxembourg 5.4 0.8 
Netherlands 54.1 -3.2 
Austria 65.1 -1.1 
Portugal 60.3 -2.8 
Finland 45.6 2.3 
Sweden 52.0 0.3 
United Kingdom 39.8 -3.3 
EU-15 64.3 -2.7 
Iceland 41.3 -1.4 
Norway 42.0 8.3 
United States 62.7 -4.7 
Japan 157.6 -8.0 
Israel* - -0.1 
*2000 
Source: Based on OECD (2004) and Eurostat (2004) 
 General public 
services 
Defence
Health Education Total 
Belgium -3.0 -2.8 1.5 -0.2 -0.5 
Denmark -3.5 -1.5 1.6 1.2 -0.9 
Germany -0.8 -1.9 0.2 -1.2 -1.7 
Greece -7.4 3.7 -2.0 1.1 -0.7 
Spain - - - - - 
France - - - - - 
Ireland - - - - - 
Italy -5.3 1.0 2.1 0.7 -1.1 
Luxembourg 0.8 -8.3 -0.7 1.0 0.0 
Netherlands -2.8 -2.9 2.4 0.2 -1.7 
Austria -2.4 -1.3 -1.9 -1.0 -1.2 
Portugal -1.8 -6.4 3.7 0.9 0.8 
Finland - - - - - 
Sweden -5.0 -2.2 1.7 0.5 -1.8 
United 
Kingdom -2.4 
-1.7 2.5 1.5 -0.4 
EU-15 -2.3 -1.8 0.6 0.5 -0.5 
Israel* -8.0 -3.7 -8.2 -6.8 
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Table A.7: Government finances, 2003 (As a % of GDP) 
 
Current taxes Social contribution 
Total general 
government 
revenue 
General 
Government 
gross fixed 
capital 
formation 
Total general 
government 
expenditure 
Belgium 31.5 14.4 51.3 1.6 51.0 
Denmark 47.1 1.7 57.2 1.7 56.2 
Germany 23.2 17.5 45.0 1.5 48.8 
Greece 23.4 12.9 43.6 3.9 48.3 
Spain 23.5 12.8 40.0 3.5 39.6 
France 27.3 16.6 50.4 3.2 54.6 
Ireland 25.3 4.6 34.4 3.9 34.3 
Italy 30.1 12.9 46.5 2.6 49.0 
Luxembourg 29.9 11.5 45.6 4.8 44.9 
Netherlands 24.8 14.5 45.8 3.6 49.0 
Austria 28.5 14.6 49.5 1.2 50.8 
Portugal 25.5 11.7 45.0 3.4 47.8 
Finland 32.9 12.1 53.2 2.9 51.1 
Sweden 36.2 14.4 58.4 3.1 58.3 
United Kingdom 29.3 7.3 40.1 1.7 43.6 
EU-15 27.4 13.4 45.8 2.4 48.5 
Israel* 21.9 7.4 49.1 1.4 48.8 
*2000 
Source: Based on Eurostat (2004) 
 
Table A.8: Taxation figures, 2002 (as % of total taxes) 
 Personal 
income 
taxes 
Corporate 
income taxes
Employees 
Social 
Security 
Employers 
Social 
Security 
Taxes in 
goods and 
services 
Other 
taxes 
Belgium 31.6 7.9 9.8 18.9 24.6 7.1 
Denmark 52.7 6.3 3.8 0.7 32.2 4.4 
Germany 27.1 1.7 17.5 19.5 28.8 5.4 
Greece 14.7 9.2 12.0 14.4 37.9 11.8 
Spain 19.6 8.1 6.0 24.7 29.3 12.4 
France 17.7 7.6 9.0 24.9 25.2 15.5 
Ireland 29.7 12.1 4.4 9.4 37.3 7.0 
Italy 25.9 8.6 5.5 20.1 25.6 14.2 
Luxembourg 17.7 18.3 12.0 12.4 26.6 13.1 
Netherlands 16.3 10.4 17.1 11.5 30.7 13.9 
Austria 22.9 6.9 13.4 15.7 27.1 14.0 
Portugal 17.9 10.8 10.0 15.4 40.0 5.8 
Finland 30.5 10.6 4.8 20.0 29.4 4.6 
Sweden 31.9 5.7 5.6 23.6 25.1 8.1 
United Kingdom 30.2 9.5 6.8 9.6 31.3 12.6 
EU-15 25.8 8.9 9.2 16.1 30.1 10.0 
Iceland 39.8 3.2 0.2 7.9 41.5 7.4 
Norway 24.2 21.7 6.9 12.3 31.3 3.5 
United States 42.3 6.5 10.8 12.5 16.1 11.8 
Japan 20.1 12.7 15.1 18.8 19.0 14.4 
Israel* 23.1 8.3 4.2 4.6 32.3 27.5 
*2000 
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Source: OECD (2004) 
 
Table A.9: Another item about taxation, 2002 
 Highest personal income 
% tax Highest corporate % tax 
Taxes / Total receipts by 
general government 
Belgium 52.1 40.2 45.8 
Denmark 54.3 30.0 49.8 
Germany 51.2 38.9 36.8 
Greece 42.5 37.5 36.9 
Spain 48.0 35.0 35.2 
France 47.3 36.4 45.0 
Ireland 42.0 20.0 29.9 
Italy 45.9 36.0 42.0 
Luxembourg 43.1 37.5 40.7 
Netherlands 52.0 35.0 39.5 
Austria 50.0 34.0 45.4 
Portugal 35.6 35.2 33.5 
Finland 52.5 29.0 46.1 
Sweden 58.2 28.0 51.4 
United Kingdom 40.0 30.0 37.3 
EU-15 47.6 33.5 41.0 
Iceland 43.1 30.0 36.5 
Norway 47.5 28.0 43.3 
United States 46.1 45.5 28.9 
Japan 45.5 40.9 27.3 
Israel - - - 
Source: OECD (2004) 
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2. Welfare State: 
Table A.10: Social protection in Europe, 2002 
 Total expenditure at 
current prices as a % 
of GDP 
Total expenditure 
per head in euros 
Social protection receipts 
by general government 
contributions as % of 
total receipts 
Belgium 29.1 7003 34,3 
Denmark 30.0 10205 65,9 
Germany 30.5 7788 41,7 
Greece 26.6 3544 45,7 
Spain 20.2 3470 39,2 
France 30.6 7633 44,0 
Ireland 16.0 5273 70,9 
Italy 26.1 5749 61,3 
Luxembourg 22.7 11596 52,0 
Netherlands 28.5 7852 46,3 
Austria 29.1 7994 39,9 
Portugal 25.4 3152 47,5 
Finland 26.4 7097 65,0 
Sweden 32.5 9328 60,0 
United Kingdom 27.6 7593 53,6 
EU-15 28.0 6748 50,8 
Iceland 22.3 6999 63,1 
Norway 26.3 11755 54,9 
 Source: Eurostat (2004) 
 
Table A.11: Total expenditure on social protection by type in Europe (% of 
total expenditure) 
Social benefits Administration costs Other expenditure  
1990 1995 2002 1990 1995 2002 1990 1995 2002 
Belgium 95 93 94 3 4 4 2 3 2 
Denmark 97 97 97 3 3 3 : : : 
Germany 96 96 96 4 4 3 0 0 0 
Greece 94 96 98 5 4 3 1 0 0 
Spain 97 98 98 3 2 2 0 0 0 
France 95 95 95 4 4 4 1 1 1 
Ireland 96 96 96 4 4 4 0 0 0 
Italy 95 95 96 4 3 3 1 2 1 
Luxembourg 96 97 98 3 3 2 1 0 0 
Netherlands 95 95 94 4 4 5 1 1 2 
Austria 97 97 97 2 2 2 1 1 1 
Portugal 88 90 90 5 4 4 7 6 6 
Finland 96 97 97 4 3 3 0 0 0 
Sweden : 99 96 : 1 4 : 0 0 
United Kingdom 95 96 96 5 4 3 0 0 1 
EU-15 : 96 96 : 4 3 : 0 1 
Iceland 98 98 99 2 2 2 0 0 0 
Norway 98 98 98 2 2 2 0 0 : 
Source: Eurostat (2004) 
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Table A.12: Social benefits by function (% of total benefits) 
 Sickness 
and 
healthcare 
D
isability 
O
ld age 
Survivors 
Fam
ily and 
children 
U
nem
ploy
m
ent 
H
ousing 
Social 
exclusion 
 1990 2002 1990 2002 1990 2002 1990 2002 1990 2002 1990 2002 1990 2002 1990 2002
Belgium 26,2 22,8 7,4 8,7 30,1 31,7 11,6 9,5 9,2 8,0 13,4 11,6 0,0 0,0 2,1 1,8
Denmark 20,1 20,3 10,0 12,5 36,6 36,6 0,1 0,0 11,9 13,0 15,4 9,0 2,3 2,2 3,6 3,5
Germany 31,8 27,3 6,3 7,4 43,3 39,4 2,5 1,5 7,6 10,3 6,0 8,2 0,6 0,7 2,1 1,7
Greece 24,8 25,5 8,5 5,1 42,5 46,0 9,2 3,3 7,5 6,8 4,1 6,2 2,4 2,3 1,0 2,2
Spain 28,8 29,3 7,7 7,3 38,3 40,8 4,6 2,9 1,7 2,5 18 13,3 0,6 0,8 0,4 0,8
France 29,4 28,1 6,1 5,5 35,9 34,6 6,8 6,4 9,3 8,8 8,3 7,2 2,9 2,9 1,2 1,3
Ireland 33,5 39,9 4,5 4,8 23,3 17,4 6,7 5,1 11,2 15,2 15,8 8,3 3,5 3,0 1,6 2,2
Italy 26,0 25,1 7,7 5,9 48,9 49,5 10,7 10,0 4,9 3,8 1,7 1,7 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,2
Luxembourg 25,2 24,4 12,5 14,0 42,0 25,9 5,6 10,8 10,5 16,3 3,0 3,5 0,2 0,9 1,1 2,2
Netherlands 28,3 29,1 16,5 10,5 32,0 33,4 5,4 5,2 5,6 4,2 8,3 5,0 1,1 1,4 2,8 4,9
Austria 26,0 24,5 7,0 7,3 38,5 39,6 11,6 8,7 10,5 10,2 4,6 5,2 0,5 0,3 1,3 1,3
Portugal 30,6 27,8 16,8 10,3 34,4 33,7 7,5 6,2 7,0 4,3 3,4 3,5 0,0 0,0 0,3 4,2
Finland 28,5 24,1 15,5 13,0 29,6 32,0 4,2 3,8 13,5 11,3 6,1 9,5 0,8 1,1 1,9 2,1
Sweden : 26,4 : 13,4 : 36,0 : 2,0 : 9,3 : 5,3 : 1,9 : 2,1
United Kingdom 24,4 26,5 9,1 8,9 41,1 41,0 4,1 3,7 9,0 6,5 5,7 3,4 6,0 5,5 0,8 0,9
EU-15 29,1 26,9 7,7 7,7 40,2 39,2 6,3 4,7 7,2 7,7 7,1 6,3 1,1 2,0 1,3 1,5
Iceland 42,9 36,6 8,5 13,4 26,7 27,7 2,9 2,8 14,5 12,7 1,9 2,0 0,0 0,8 2,5 2,5
Norway 29,0 33,4 14,7 17,3 32,7 28,3 1,7 1,4 10,8 12,0 6,9 2,5 0,6 0,6 3,5 2,4
Israel* 23.2 21.4 9.8 12.9 37.41 34.41 37.41 34.41 23.5 23.7 6.1 7.6 : : : : 
*2000 - 1Old age and survivors are accounted together - Source: Eurostat (2004) 
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3. Research and Development:  
 Table A.13: Research & Development figures. (As a % of GDP) 
 
Government 
appropiations 
2002 
Public 
Sector R&D 
2002 
Defence 
R&D 
2002 
Growth 95-02 
(annual 
average rate) 
Growth 90-02 
(annual 
average rate) 
Belgium 0,62 0,45 0,00 2,27 1,48 
Denmark 0,67 0,68 0,01 -0,82 -0,71 
Germany 0,79 0,79 0,05 -1,85 -1,44 
Greece* 0,32 0,33 0,00 1,99 3,82 
Spain 0,77 0,36 0,21 6,67 3,16 
France 1,02 0,84 0,23 -1,33 -2,37 
Ireland 0,30 0,26 0,01 -1,35 0,58 
Italy* 0,58 0,51 0,00 -1,00 -2,27 
Luxembourg 0,21 0,66 0,01 : : 
Netherlands 0,81 0,70 0,01 0,91 -0,69 
Austria 0,67 0,73 0,00 0,00 1,66 
Portugal 0,70 0,51 0,01 6,52 5,70 
Finland 0,99 0,89 0,02 0,15 1,69 
Sweden* 0,76 0,89 0,06 -7,79 -4,22 
United Kingdom 0,70 0,53 0,26 -1,53 -1,98 
EU-15 0,78 0,65 0,12 -0,71 -1,19 
Iceland : 0,99 0,00 -0,92 4,33 
Norway 0,78 0,70 0,05 -0,54 -0,81 
United States 0,98 0,71 0,61 0,75 -0,96 
Japan* 0,64 0,58 0,04 5,06 3,82 
Israel* 0,26 0,26 : 1,98 2,01 
*2000 instead of 2002 - Source: Eurostat (2004) 
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4. Employment: 
Table A.14: Civilian employment in Public Sector, 2003 (thousands in 
estimated annual average) 
 
Public admon. 
and defense, 
compulsory social 
security 
Education Health and social work 
Other community, 
social and 
personal service 
activities 
Belgium 401 343 505 151 
Denmark 149 225 484 135 
Germany** 2704 1952 3743 1969 
Greece 322 284 184 149 
Spain 1104 979 986 708 
France 2202 1710 2757 993 
Ireland 91 118 176 89 
Italy 1851 1477 1348 970 
Luxembourg 21 12 16 7 
Netherlands* 548 514 1146 359 
Austria 215 231 325 165 
Portugal 333 296 298 156 
Finland 116 173 342 126 
Sweden 245 482 686 218 
United Kingdom 1970 2450 3302 1616 
Iceland** 6 12 22 10 
Norway 137 190 441 94 
European Union-
15 12272 11246 16298 7811 
*2002, **2001 - Source: OECD LFS (2004) 
Table A.15: Employees in Public Sector, 2003 (thousands in estimated 
annual average) 
 Public admon. and 
defense, compulsory 
social security 
Education Health and social work 
Other community, 
social and personal 
service activities 
Belgium 400 340 432 110 
Denmark 148 222 466 122 
Germany** 2704 1870 3415 1608 
Greece 321 261 155 109 
Spain 1104 939 927 560 
France 2201 1685 2481 847 
Ireland 90 113 165 69 
Italy 1825 1432 1162 608 
Luxembourg 21 12 14 6 
Netherlands* 543 495 1081 269 
Austria 215 226 298 135 
Portugal 330 289 285 116 
Finland 116 170 324 99 
Sweden 245 477 673 174 
United Kingdom 1956 2341 3085 1233 
Iceland** 69 11 20 8 
Norway 137 188 426 80 
European 
Union-15 12219 10872 14963 6065 
*2002, **2001 - Source: OECD LFS (2004) 
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Table A.16: Growth in civilian employment, 1995-2003 (annual average 
growth rate) 
 Public admon. and 
defense, compulsory 
social security 
Education Health and social work 
Other community, 
social and personal 
service activities 
Belgium 0,51 0,56 3,58 0,68 
Denmark -0,65 2,48 1,40 2,02 
Germany -1,87 0,87 2,51 1,46 
Greece 2,13 3,24 1,53 2,12 
Spain 3,99 4,23 5,68 5,20 
France* : : : : 
Ireland 3,33 4,03 7,19 2,69 
Italy 0,93 -0,10 1,44 2,11 
Luxembourg 3,46 3,66 4,80 4,30 
Netherlands 0,11 2,32 2,84 3,58 
Austria* 0,34 0,34 0,50 -0,15 
Portugal 0,23 -0,97 5,38 -2,04 
Finland -0,32 2,06 2,04 2,93 
Sweden 2,19 6,28 -2,10 0,12 
United Kingdom 3,03 3,00 2,39 2,04 
Iceland 0,00 3,66 0,58 0,00 
Norway 1,78 1,78 2,71 1,42 
European Union-
15 0,69 1,76 2,44 1,94 
*1995-2001 - Source: OECD (2004) 
Table A.17: Growth in employees, 1995-2003 (annual average growth rate) 
 Public admon. and 
defense, compulsory 
social security 
Education Health and social work 
Other community, 
social and personal 
service activities 
Belgium 0,54 0,53 3,74 1,58 
Denmark -0,74 2,44 1,43 2,52 
Germany -1,87 0,78 2,59 1,29 
Greece 2,14 3,51 1,19 3,31 
Spain 4,01 4,25 5,70 6,36 
France* 1,11 0,59 0,99 4,18 
Ireland 3,19 3,93 7,14 2,42 
Italy 0,83 0,24 1,68 3,11 
Luxembourg 3,46 3,66 5,68 5,20 
Netherlands 0,19 2,35 3,08 3,58 
Austria* 0,34 0,23 0,59 -0,56 
Portugal 0,23 -0,87 5,69 -2,41 
Finland -0,32 1,92 1,75 2,54 
Sweden 2,19 6,24 -2,11 -0,21 
United Kingdom 3,05 2,98 2,51 1,02 
Iceland 35,70 2,54 -0,61 1,68 
Norway 1,78 1,64 2,67 2,05 
European Union-
15 0,68 1,72 2,56 1,90 
Israel* 4.6 -0.1 10.5 - 
*1995-2001 - Source: OECD (2004) 
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Figure A.1: Share of public administrations (*) in total employment 
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(*) Including defence and compulsory social security 
 
 
  
 72
Figure A.2: Share of health and social work in total employment 
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